Safety Investigation Report 2018:Section 1

The Safety Investigation Report MH370/01/2018 was released by the The Malaysian ICAO Annex 13 Safety Investigation Team for MH370 in July 2018 as an English version only in portable document format (pdf). The content below is a text extract formatted in html. Images are not included. Links to the five sections of the report are provided below.

Section 1 Factual Information Section 2 Analysis Section 3 Findings and Conclusion
Section 4 Safety Recommendations Section 5 Comments to the Report.

SECTION 1 – FACTUAL INFORMATION

1.1 HISTORY OF THE FLIGHT

1.1.1 Introduction

UTC1 On 07 March 2014 at 1642 [0042 MYT, 08 March 2014], Malaysia Airlines (MAS) Flight MH370 Beijing-bound international scheduled passenger flight departed from Runway 32 Right, KL International Airport (KLIA) with a total of 239 persons on board (227 passengers and 12 crew). The aircraft was a Boeing 777-200ER, registered as 9M-MRO.

The Pilot-in-Command (PIC) signed in for duty at 1450 UTC [2250 MYT], 07 March 2014 followed by the First Officer (FO) who signed in 25 minutes later. The MAS Operations Despatch Centre (ODC) released the flight at around 1515 UTC [2315 MYT].

The PIC, an authorised examiner for the Department of Civil Aviation (DCA), Malaysia, was conducting the last phase of line training for the FO, who was transitioning to the Boeing 777 (B777) aircraft type from the Airbus A330. As the FO was certified functional during his last line training flight, no additional pilot was required as safety pilot on MH370. It has been established that the PIC had assigned the FO to be the Pilot Flying for this flight.

The PIC ordered 49,100 kilograms (kg) of fuel for the flight that gave an endurance of 07 hours and 31 minutes including reserves (as per computerised flight plan). The planned flight duration was 05 hours and 34 minutes.

The recorded radio transmissions between the Air Traffic Controllers at Kuala Lumpur Area Control Centre (KL ACC) and the FO showed that an airways clearance request to Lumpur Airways Clearance Delivery was made at 1625:52 UTC [0025:52 MYT] and a pushback and start clearance request to Lumpur Ground was made at 1627:37 UTC [0027:37 MYT].

Note: In accordance with the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) of MAS, radio

1 Unless specified, all times in this report are in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC). The Malaysian Time (MYT) is UTC+08 hours.

communication on the ground is the responsibility of the FO. In the air, the role is reversed when the assigned pilot flying is the FO.

Lumpur Tower cleared MH370 for take-off at 1640:37 UTC [0040:37 MYT]. At 1642:53 UTC [0042:53 MYT] Lumpur Departure cleared MH370 to climb to Flight Level (FL) 180 (the aviation term for 18,000 feet [ft.]) and to cancel the Standard Instrument Departure (SID) clearance by tracking direct to waypoint2 IGARI.

At 1643:31 UTC [0043:31 MYT], KL ACC Sector 3 Planner coordinated with Ho Chi Minh (Viet Nam) Area Control Centre (HCM ACC) on the Direct Speech Circuit (direct telephone line) relaying the estimated time of arrival (ETA) of MH370 for waypoint IGARI as 1722 UTC [0122 MYT] and the assigned Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) transponder code A2157.

MH370 was transferred to Lumpur Radar at 1646:39 UTC [0046:39 MYT].

At 1646:58 UTC [0046:58 MYT], MH370 was cleared to climb to FL250 and subsequently to FL350 at 1650:08 UTC [0050:08 MYT]. MH370 reported maintaining FL350 at 1701:17 UTC [0101:17 MYT] and reported maintaining FL350 again at 1707:56 UTC [0107:56 MYT].

At 1719:26 UTC [0119:26 MYT], MH370 was instructed to contact HCM ACC on the radio frequency 120.9 MHz.

At 1719:30 UTC [0119:30 MYT], MH370 acknowledged with “Good night Zero”. This was the last recorded radio transmission Malaysian Three Seven from MH370.

Radar recording showed that MH370 passed through waypoint IGARI at 1720:31 UTC [0120:31 MYT].

Based on the reconstruction of the flight profile conducted on the B777 simulator, the flight would be at waypoint IGARI one minute earlier than the original ETA of 1722 UTC [0122 MYT].

2 Waypoint - A specified geographical location used to define an area navigation route or the flight path of an aircraft employing area navigation. Waypoints are identified as either: • Fly-by waypoint - A waypoint which requires turn anticipation to allow tangential interception of the next segment of a route or procedure, or • Flyover waypoint - A waypoint at which a turn is initiated in order to join the next segment of a route or procedure. 2

The Mode S symbol of MH370 dropped off from radar display at 1720:36 UTC [0120:36 MYT], and the last secondary radar position symbol of MH370 was recorded at 1721:13 UTC [0121:13 MYT].

The disappearance of the radar position symbol of MH370 was captured by the KL ACC radar at 1721:13 UTC [0121:13 MYT]. The Malaysian military radar and radar sources from two other countries, namely Viet Nam and Thailand, also captured the disappearance of the radar position symbol of MH370. The Bangkok radar target drop occurred at 1721:13 UTC [0121:13 MYT] and Viet Nam’s at 1720:59 UTC [0120:59 MYT].

The last Aircraft Communication Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) (refer to ACARS) transmission was made through the aircraft’s Section 1.9.4 - satellite communication system at 1707:29 UTC [0107:29 MYT].

(below) shows the Figure 1.1A Chronological Sequence of Events of the Disappearance of MH370 (in pictorial form and not to scale)

1.1.2 Actions by HCM ACC and KL ACC

At 1739:06 UTC [0139:06 MYT] HCM ACC queried KL ACC on the whereabouts of MH370. KL ACC contacted MAS ODC to check on the whereabouts of MH370.

HCM ACC had also contacted Hong Kong (China) ACC and Phnom Penh (Cambodia) ACC in an attempt to establish the location of MH370. However, no contact had been established by any of the ATC units.

Kuala Lumpur Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre (KL ARCC) was activated at 2130 UTC [0530 MYT]. There is no evidence to show HCM ACC activated its Rescue Coordination Centre.

1.1.3 Diversion from Filed Flight Plan Route

Malaysian Military Radar
The Military radar data provided more extensive details of what was termed as “Air Turn Back”. It became very apparent, however, that the recorded altitude and speed change “blip” to “blip” were well beyond the

capability of the aircraft. It was highlighted to the Team that the altitude and speed extracted from the data are subjected to inherent error. The only useful information obtained from the Military radar was the latitude and longitude position of the aircraft as this data is reasonably accurate.

At 1721:13 UTC [0121:13 MYT] the Military radar showed the radar return of MH370 turning right but shortly after, making a constant left turn to heading of 273°, flying parallel to Airway M765 to VKB (Kota Bharu).

Between 1724:57 UTC [0124; 57 MYT] to 1737:35 UTC [0137:35 MYT] the “blip” (a spot of light on a radar screen indicating the position of a detected aircraft) made heading changes that varied between 8° and 20°, and a ground speed that varied from 451 kt to 529 kt. The Military data also recorded a significant height variation from 31,150 to 39,116 ft.

The Military data further identified the “blip” on a heading of 239° at 1737:59 UTC [0137:59 MYT] parallel to Airway B219 towards VPG (VOR Penang). Heading of this “blip” varied from 239° to 255° at a speed from 532 to 571 kt. The height of this “blip” was recorded between 24,450 ft and 47,500 ft.

At 1752:31 UTC [0152:31 MYT] the “blip” was observed to be at 10 nm south of Penang Island on a heading of 261°, speed of 525 kt and at a height of 44,700 ft.

At 1801:59 UTC [0201:59 MYT] the data showed the “blip” on a heading of 022°, speed of 492 kt and altitude at 4,800 ft. This is supported by the “blip” detected by Military radar in the area of Pulau Perak at altitude 4,800 ft at 1801:59 UTC [0201:59 MYT]. At 1803:09 UTC [0203:09 MYT] the “blip” disappeared, only to reappear at 1815:25 UTC [0215:25 MYT] until 1822:12 UTC [0222:12 MYT], about 195 nm from Butterworth, on a heading of 285°, speed of 516 kt and at an altitude of 29,500 ft.

9\ At 1721:13 UTC [0121:13 MYT], 3.2 nm FPL MH370 after passing IGARI, the radar position symbol of MH370 dropped off KUALA LUMPUR -R208 IGARI M765-W1- 8 MH370 Mode S symbol dropped off at BMT-W12-PCA-G221- 1720:36 UTC [0120:36 MYT] BUNTA-A1-IKELA-P901- IDOSI-DCT CH-DCT 7 MH370 over waypoint IGARI at 1720:31 BEKOL-A461-YIN-VYK- BMT UTC [0120:31 MYT] BEIJING TSN 6 A t 1719:26 UTC [0119:26 MYT], 8.6 nm to waypoint IGARI, KL ACC instructed MH370 to contact HCM ACC IGARI MH370 acknowledged with ‘Good night Zero’ at 1719:30 UTC 9 Malaysian Three Seven 8 [0119:30 MYT] 9 7 5 MH370 maintaining FL350 at 1701:17 UTC [0101:17 MYT] BITOD 5 MH370 reported again maintaining FL350 at 1707:56 UTC [0107:56 MYT] 4 3 M H370 climbing to FL350 at 1650:11 UTC 4 [0050:11 MYT] 2 3 MH370 climbing to FL250 at 1647:03 UTC 1 [0047:03 MYT] 2 MH370 climbing to FL180 at 1643:01 UTC [0043:01 MYT] Lumpur Tower cleared for take-off at 1 1640:37 UTC [0040:37 MYT] and MH370 Figure 1.1A - Chronological Sequence of Events of Disappearance of MH370 departed at 1642 UTC [0042 MYT] (in pictorial form and not to scale)

Figure 1.1A – Chronological Sequence of Events of Disappearance of MH370 (in pictorial form and not to scale)

The tracking by the Military continued as the “blip” was observed to be heading towards waypoint MEKAR on Airway N571 when it finally disappeared at 1822:12 UTC [0222:12 MYT], 10 nm after waypoint MEKAR.

On the day of the disappearance of MH370, the Military radar system recognised the ‘blip’ that appeared west after the left turn over IGARI was that of MH370. Even with the loss of SSR data, the Military long range air defence radar with Primary Surveillance Radar (PSR) capabilities affirmed that it was MH370 based on its track behaviour, characteristics and constant/continuous track pattern/trend. Therefore, the Military did not pursue to intercept the aircraft since it was ‘friendly’ and did not pose any threat to national airspace security, integrity and sovereignty.

Based on the Malaysian Military data, a reconstruction of the profile was conducted on a Boeing 777 simulator. (below) in chart form Figure 1.1B shows the Some of Profile Chart of Data from Malaysian Military Radar. the speed and height variations were not achievable even after repeated simulator sessions.

It was also noted that, in the absence of autopilot or continuous manual control, an aircraft is very unlikely to maintain straight and level flight. Further, it is extremely unlikely for an aircraft to enter and maintain a turn and then return to straight and level flight for any significant period of time.
DCA Civilian Radar Data from Kota Bharu - Sultan Ismail Petra Airport Runway
The aircraft diversion from the filed flight plan route was recorded on the DCA radar playback:
1. From 1730:37 UTC [0130:37 MYT] to 1744:52 UTC [0144:52 MYT] a primary aircraft target was captured by the Terminal Primary Approach Radar located to the south of the Kota Bharu – Sultan Ismail Petra Airport runway.
2. The appearance of an aircraft target on the KL ACC radar display, coded as P3362, was recorded at 1730:37 UTC [0130:37 MYT] but the aircraft target disappeared from the radar display at 1737:22 UTC [0137:22 MYT].
3. At 1738:56 UTC [0138:56 MYT] an aircraft target, coded as P3401, appeared on the KL ACC radar display and disappeared at 1744:52 UTC [0144:52 MYT].
4. At 1747:02 UTC [0147:02 MYT] an aircraft target, coded as P3415, appeared on the KL ACC radar display but disappeared at 1748:39 UTC [0148:39 MYT], which appeared to be the continuity of the same target.
5. At 1751:45 UTC [0151:45 MYT] an aircraft target, coded as P3426, appeared on the KL ACC radar display but disappeared at 1752:35 UTC [0152:35 MYT].
  (below) shows Figure 1.1C Diversion from Filed Flight Plan Route (in pictorial form and not to scale).
  
  It has been confirmed by DCA and its radar maintenance contractor, Advanced Air Traffic Systems (M) Sdn. Bhd. (AAT), that it was the 60 nm Terminal Primary Approach Radar, co-mounted with 200 nm monopulse SSR3 located to the south of Kota Bharu - Sultan Ismail Petra Airport runway, which captured the above-mentioned primary aircraft targets.
  
  3 SSR (Secondary Surveillance Radar) - A surveillance radar system which uses transmitters/receivers system transponders. (interrogators) and
  
  Figure 1.1B - Profile Chart of Data from Malaysian Military Radar (not to scale).
  
  FPL MH370 1 P3362: Appeared at 1730:37 UTC [0130:37 MYT] KUALA LUMPUR -R208 IGARI M765-W1-BMT- P3362: C oasted at 1737:12 UTC [0137:12 MYT] 2 W12-PCA-G221- Droppe d at 1737:22 UTC [0137:22 MYT] BUNTA-A1- P3401: Appeared at 1738:56 UTC [0138:56 MYT] 3 IKELA-P901- IDOSI-DCT CH- P3401: Coasted at 1744:42 UTC [0144:42 MYT] 4 DCT BEKOL- Droppe d at 1744:52 UTC [0144:52 MYT] TSN A461-YIN-VYK- 5 P3415: Appeared at 1747:02 UTC [0147:02 MYT] BEIJING NILAM 6 P34 15 : Coasted at 1748:29 UTC [0148:29 MYT] Dropped at 1748:39 UTC [0148:39 MYT] MEKAR Kota Bharu P3426: Appeared at 1751:45 UTC [0151:45 MYT] 1 7 BITODB VAMPI 2 8 P3426: Coasted at 1752:25 UTC [0152:25 MYT] 10 Dropped at 1752:35 UTC [0152:35 MYT] P3426 last seen on radar display IGARI 5 3 7 Approximately 6 nm south of Penang 4 9 6 8 9 The primary target (military radar) appeared to track west-northwest direction joining RNAV Route N571 at waypoint VAMPI thence to 10 nm north MEKAR Source: RMAF 10 The primary target ended at 10 nm after MEKAR at 1822:12 UTC [0222:12 MYT] Source: RMAF Figure 1.1C - Diversion from Filed Flight Plan Route - Civilian Radar (in pictorial form and not to scale) Filed Flight Plan Route Diversion route Rada r targe t appearance Radar target coasted/dropped off
  
  (below) shows the suitable airports for emergency en-route diversion. Figure 1.1D
  
  Langkawi Kota Bharu
  
  Penang Kuala Terengganu
  
  Medan
  
  Figure 1.1D - Airports for Emergency Landing along the Flightpath of MH370 (chart not to scale)
  
  (below) shows the MH370. Figure 1.1E Filed Flight Plan message of
  
  Source: DCA Malaysia Figure 1.1E - Filed Flight Plan message of MH370.
  
  (below) shows Radar Data Plots (RDP) Tracks from the 60 Figure 1.1F nm Terminal Primary Approach Radar co-mounted with 200 nm monopulse SSR located to the south of Kota Bharu - Sultan Ismail Petra Airport runway after Diversion and (below) shows RDP Figure 1.1G Tracks from Kuala Lumpur after take-off.
  
  All the primary aircraft targets that were recorded by the DCA radar are consistent with those of the military data that were made available to the Investigation Team.
  
  Source: Advanced Air Traffic Systems (M) Sdn. Bhd. (AAT) Figure 1.1F - Radar Data Plots (RDP) Tracks from the 60 nm Terminal Primary Approach Radar co-mounted with 200 nm monopulse SSR located to the south of Kota Bharu - Sultan Ismail Petra Airport runway after Diversion.
  
  Source: Advanced Air Traffic Systems (M) Sdn. Bhd. (AAT) Figure 1.1G - Radar Data Plots (RDP) Tracks from Kuala Lumpur after take-off
  
  Reference:
  
  The Malaysia Aeronautical Information Publication [AIP] ENR 1.6 dated 05 June 2008, AIP AMDT 2/2008 on the Provision of Radar Services and Procedures states that, in paragraph 1.1.4:
  
  “In the Kuala Lumpur and Kota Kinabalu FIRs, radar services are provided using the following civil/military ATC Radars: g) A 60 nm Terminal Primary Approach Radar co-mounted with 200 nm monopulse SSR located to the south of Kota Bharu - Sultan Ismail Petra Airport runway.”.
  
  (below) shows the Radar Coverage Chart of Kuala Figure 1.1H Lumpur and Kota Kinabalu FIRs. 13
  
  Source: DCA Malaysia
  
  Figure 1.1H - Radar Coverage Chart of Kuala Lumpur and Kota Kinabalu Flight Information Regions
Ho Chi Minh Air Traffic Services
The tracking of MH370 was captured by HCM ACC Secondary Radar at Tan Son Nhut and at Camau Province, and Automatic Dependent Surveillance- Broadcast (ADS-B) located at Conson Island/range 270 nm) at 1711:59 UTC [0111:59 MYT] as it was heading for waypoint IGARI.

At 1720:59 UTC [0120:45 MYT] the “blip” from MH370 from both SSR and ADS-B radar position symbols disappeared from the radar display.

A visit was made to the office of the Vietnamese Civil Aviation Authority (CAAV) in Ho Chi Minh City on 10 September 2014. In interviews, the Duty HCM Duty ACC Controller who was handling MH370 on that night could not explain why he did not initiate any call to MH370 within the standard 5 minutes as specified in the Letter of Agreement (LOA) between Department of Civil Aviation Malaysia and Viet Nam Air Traffic Management dated 07 July 2001 and effective on 01 November 2001 (Refer Appendix 1.1A - Letter of Agreement between DCA Malaysia and Nam). It was noted that he had only initiated an enquiry on the Viet whereabouts of MH370 at 1739:03 UTC [0139:03 MYT] after a lapse of 12 minutes.

The Duty Controller however had stated that he had initiated calls to other aircraft on the existing frequency and on the emergency frequency of 121.5 MHz. This was neither supported nor collaborated by any documents.

The landline recorded transcripts between KL ACC and HCM ACC suggested that there were confusions on the position of MH370. This was evident when HCM ACC requested KL ACC for information on MH370 at 1739:06 UTC [0139:06 MYT]. This conversation took place:

KL ACC: “MH370 already transferred to you rite?” HCM ACC: “Yeah…yeah…I know at time two zero but we have no just about in contact up to BITOD…we have radar lost with him…the one radar.” we have to track identified via

When pointed out that neither HCM ACC SSR nor ADS-B showed any presence of a “blip” of MH370, the Duty Controller could not explain why he mentioned BITOD.

MH370 was operating within the Singapore FIR, in that portion of the airspace which has been delegated to Malaysia (Refer to Figure 2.2K - for the provision of air traffic Singapore Airspace delegated to Malaysia) 15

services when the last air-ground radio contact was made at 1719 UTC [0119 MYT]. As such, KL ACC should be responsible for the alerting service which would mean that KL ACC would have to declare the Distress Phase at 1827 UTC [0227 MYT] when HCM ACC informed that there had been no two-way radio communications with MH37O.

The was only declared at 2232 UTC [0632 MYT]. Refer to DETRESFA para. 2.2.7 Table 2.2C, No. 26-28 - Chronology of ATC Events following the Disappearance of MH370; and to para. 2.2.8 1) o) - Activation of Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre, for details.

Reference:

Manual of Air Traffic Services, Part 9 - Emergencies, para. 9-6-5, Para, 6.7.2 dated 15/3/2009 states:

If alerting service is required for an aircraft that is flight planned to operate through more than one FIR including the airspace delegate to the Kuala Lumpur and Kota Kinabalu ATSCs and the position of the aircraft is in doubt, the responsibility for co-ordinating such service shall normally rest with the ATSC of the respective FIRs:
- within which the aircraft was flying at the time of last air-ground radio contact;
- that the aircraft was about to enter when last air-ground contact was established at or close to the boundary of two FIRs or control areas;
- within which the aircraft’s intermediate stop or final destination point is located: 1) if the aircraft was not equipped with suitable two-way radio communication, or
was not under obligations to transmit position reports. and
ICAO Doc 4444 ATM/501 Procedures for Air Navigation - Air Traffic Management (PANS-ATM), page 9-6, para 9.2.2.2, dated 22/11/07 states:

When alerting services is required in respect of a flight operated through more than one FIR or control area, and when the position of the aircraft is in doubt, responsibility for coordinating such service

shall rest with the ATS unit of the FIR or control area within which the aircraft was flying at the time of last air-ground radio contact:
1. that the aircraft was about to enter when last air-ground contact was established at or close to the boundary of two FIRs or control areas;
2. within which the aircraft’s intermediate stop or final destination point is located:
if the aircraft was not equipped with suitable two-way radio communication, or
was not under obligations to transmit position reports.
Based on interviews, HCM ACC had stated that it did not initiate any emergency actions as it did not receive any change of the transfer of control time of IGARI, MH370 did not contact the Centre at the stated time, and it was unable to establish radio communication with MH370.

MH370 was also operating in the airspace delegated to KL ACC and the last air-ground radio contact was with KL ACC. Hence the provision of alerting service for MH370 rests with KL ACC.

These uncertainties were further compounded by the Duty Despatcher, based on MAS Flight Following System (FFS), who mentioned that the aircraft was over the Cambodian airspace when in fact the filed flight plan routing did not include flying over the Cambodian airspace.

Added to these confusions, for reasons best known to him, the MAS Captain from the Technical and Development Department, Flight Operations spoke to KL ACC saying that the aircraft did not leave the Malaysian airspace. When interviewed, the Captain insisted that he was asking a question rather than making a statement. This conversation was recorded at 0521.23 MYT:

KL ACC: “…had never leave Lumpur airspace?” MAS Captain: “…yea he has not left Lumpur airspace because he has failed to call Ho Chi Minh.”
Kuala Lumpur ACC Radar
KL ACC Radar captured the disappearance of MH370 at 1721:13 UTC [0121:13 MYT]. In interviews with the Duty KL ACC Radar Controller, he stated that he did not notice the “blip” disappearance as MH370 was out

of radar coverage and would be in contact with HCM ACC after the transfer of responsibility was effected.

From 1730:37 UTC [0130:37 MYT] to 1752:35 UTC [0152:35 MYT], what appeared to be MH370 was captured on KL ACC primary radar, coded as P3362, P3401, P1415, P3415 and P3426 (P signifies Primary Radar). Figure 1.1C - Diversion from Filed Flight Plan Route. The appearance of a “blip” coded as P3362 was recorded at 1730:37 UTC [0130:37 MYT)] but disappeared abruptly at 1737:22 UTC [0137:22 MYT].

At 1738:56 UTC [0138:56 MYT], a “blip” identified as P3401 was tracked by KL ACC but disappeared at 1744:52 UTC [0144:52 MYT].

Shortly after, another “blip” coded as P3451 appeared at 1747.02 UTC [0147:02 MYT] but disappeared at 1748:39 UTC [0148:39 MYT].

At 1751:45 UTC [0151:45 MYT], a “blip” coded as P3426 appeared south of Penang Island but disappeared at 1752:35 UTC [0152:35 MYT].
Medan Air Traffic Control Radar
The Medan ATC Radar has a range of 240 nm, but for unknown reasons, did not pick up any radar return bearing the SSR transponder code A2157 of MH370.

The Indonesian Military however stated that they picked up MH370 earlier as it was heading towards waypoint IGARI.

No other information was made available.
Bangkok Air Traffic Control Radar
The radar position symbol with SSR transponder code A2157 was detected on the Aeronautical Radio of Thailand Limited (AEROTHAI) radar display at 1711 UTC [0111 MYT] as the aircraft was tracking for waypoint IGARI.

Thailand DCA is a government agency whereas AEROTHAI is a state enterprise under the Ministry of Transport and Communications. AEROTHAI is the air navigation service provider responsible for the provision of Air Traffic Services within the Bangkok Flight Information Region (FIR).

As the flight plan of MH370 did not fall under the purview of Thailand’s FIR, Bangkok ACC did not pay attention to this flight. On playback of the radar recording it was noted that the radar position symbol of A2157 disappeared at 1721:13 UTC [0121:13 MYT].
Singapore Air Traffic Services
The Team visited Singapore to conduct interviews with officers from Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore (CAAS) and the Air Traffic Controllers on duty on 07 March 2014. The following were noted:
1. Singapore ACC did not have radar coverage over the South China Sea. (ADS and CPDLC services are available to suitably equipped aircraft operating outside radar cover over the South China Sea …);
  Reference:
  
  AIP Singapore page 94 GEN 3.4-2, 10 MAR 11, para 3.2.2 d.
2. At 2104:00 UTC [0504:00 MYT], Singapore ACC received a call from Hong Kong ACC enquiring any knowledge of a missing Malaysian aircraft MH370. Hong Kong ACC then requested assistance from Singapore ACC to contact Lumpur ACC for detailed information. It was evident that Singapore ACC was not aware of the problem until this call was received. Hong Kong ACC however had the knowledge of the missing Aircraft earlier after receiving unconfirmed information from HCM ACC;
3. At 2109:13 UTC [0509:13 MYT], Singapore ACC contacted Lumpur ACC to relay the query from Hong Kong ACC.
  Reference
  
  Radiotelephony transcripts between Singapore ACC and KL ACC on Sector 3+5 Planner - Appendix 1.18G Direct Line Coordination pages 109 to 114. Communication,

1.1.4 Role of Malaysian Military

On the day of the disappearance of MH370, the Military radar system recognised the ‘blip’ that appeared west after the left turn over IGARI was that of MH370. Even with the loss of SSR data, the Military long range air defence radar with Primary Surveillance Radar (PSR) capabilities affirmed that it was MH370 based on its track behaviour, characteristics and constant/ 19

continuous track pattern/trend. Therefore, the Military did not pursue to intercept the aircraft since it was ‘friendly’ and did not pose any threat to national airspace security, integrity and sovereignty.

1.1.5 Detection of Hand Phone Signal

A Telco service provider in an interview with the RMP confirmed a signal “hit” occurred at 0152:27 MYT on 08 March 2014, coming from the mobile phone tower (LBS Location Base station) at Bandar Baru Farlim Penang. The signal “hit” however did not record any communication except to confirm that it was in the ON mode signal related to the “hit”. The phone number was xxxxxxx later traced to that registered under the FO. This was supported by the RMP’s report.

To ascertain the probability of making calls inside an aircraft from different altitudes, a reconstructed flight using a King Air 350 over the said area and during the same time when the signal “hit” happened was carried out shortly after the disappearance of MH370. The flight was conducted from an altitude of 24,000 ft with step descents every 4,000 ft until 8,000 ft. The next descent was to 5,000 ft but at 1,000 ft interval. An expert from a Telco service provider conducted the test using three different brands of phone and related equipment that were carried on board the King Air 350. Test call will be automatically answered by the server in the event of connectivity.

In summary, during the tests, it was found that it was difficult to maintain successful call connectivity above 8,000 ft. However, one brand of phone was able to make a call at 20,000 ft. Only one cell phone service provider recorded the highest call attempts using their 3G network above 8,000 ft. Two service providers could only provide connection below 8,000 ft.

The Telco service provider expert cautioned the Team that the tests would be difficult to conclude and use as scientific/theoretical assumptions for the case of MH370, as the measurement results were only valid for that specific time, flight path, speed, altitude, devices used, and environment during the tests.

1.1.6 Search for Aircraft

Extensive work done by the MH370 Search Strategy Group, coordinated by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), by analysing signals transmitted by the aircraft’s satellite communications terminal to Inmarsat’s Indian Ocean Region satellite indicated that the aircraft continued to fly for

several hours after loss of contact. The analysis showed the aircraft changed course shortly after it passed the northern tip of Sumatra (Indonesia) and travelled in a southerly direction until it ran out of fuel in the southern Indian Ocean west of Australia. Details of this work can be found in the ATSB’s report: AE-2014-054 dated 26 June 2014, and in subsequent updates, available at ATSB’s website: http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2014/aair/ae-2014-054/

On 03 October 2017, the ATSB published a report detailing the history of the search and made conclusions and recommendations relating to the search activities. This is contained in the report titled “The Operational Search for The report and relevant attachments are available at ATSB’s MH370”. website: https://www.atsb.gov.au/newsroom/news-items/2017/chapter-closes-on-mh370/

The search for Malaysia Airlines flight MH370 commenced on 8 March 2014 and continued for 1,046 days until 17 January 2017 when it was suspended in accordance with a decision made by the Governments of Malaysia, Australia and the People’s Republic of China. This involved surface searches in the South China Sea, Straits of Malacca and the southern Indian Ocean. The 52 days of the surface search involving aircraft and surface vessels covered an area of several million square kilometres. A sub surface search for the aircraft’s underwater locator beacons was also conducted during the surface search. The underwater search started with a bathymetry survey which mapped a total of 710,000 square kilometres of Indian Ocean seafloor and continued with a high-resolution sonar search which covered an area in excess of 120,000 square kilometres. The last search vessel left the underwater search area on 17 January 2017 without locating the missing aircraft. Although combined scientific studies continued to refine areas of probability, there was no new information at that date to determine the specific location of the aircraft.

On 10 January 2018, the Malaysian Government entered into an agreement with the US company, Ocean Infinity, to conduct a 90-day underwater search in an area that was considered the most likely location for the wreckage. This search which commenced in the identified search area on 22 January 2018 was completed on 29 May 2018 without locating the missing aircraft. The search utilising the most advance underwater search technology currently available covered an area in excess of 112,000 square kilometres.

Details on the whole search effort for the aircraft have been documented elsewhere, in particular in the Australian Transport Safety Bureau report, “The Operational Search for MH370”, in relation to the search in the southern Indian Ocean and the weekly updates provided by the MH370 Response Team in relation to the re-activated search by Ocean Infinity, and are separate and distinct from this Safety Investigation Report.

1.2 INJURIES TO PERSONS

While injuries to persons on the flight could not be established as no survivors or bodies were found to date, the fact remains that there are 239 persons still missing.

1.3 DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT

Several pieces of debris were found washed ashore the south eastern coasts of Africa (South Africa, Mozambique and Tanzania), the Islands of Madagascar, Mauritius and Réunion, suggesting that the aircraft had suffered damage.

Refer to - for the list of significant Section 1.12 Wreckage and Impact Information debris possibly/confirmed belonging to MH370, recovered and examined to date.

1.4 OTHER DAMAGES

Other damages could not be established as the main wreckage of the aircraft had not been found. There was no reported ground impact or damage to any ground facilities or properties.

1.5 PERSONNEL INFORMATION

1.5.1 Introduction

This investigation emphasised on the Pilot-in-Command (PIC), First Officer (FO) and the 10 cabin crew but did not include the passengers on board Flight MH370. The factual information of the crew was gathered from the following sources:

Personal records/files of the Pilot-in-Command, First Officer and the Cabin Crew from Malaysia Airlines
These documents included the log book, certificates, licences, medical records and any disciplinary/administrative actions;
Investigation details from the Polis Di Raja Malaysia (Royal Malaysia Police)
These were statements obtained from the next-of-kin and relatives, doctors/ care givers, co-workers, friends and acquaintances; financial records of the flight crew; Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) recordings at KLIA; and analysis of the radio transmission made between MH370 and ground air traffic control;
Medical records from private health care facilities and from the Malaysia Airlines Medical Centre; and
Interviews with Malaysia Airlines staff and several of the next-of- kin of the crew
The facts obtained were in relation to the demographic and employment history, financial background and insurance cover, significant past medical and medication history, psychological, social and behavioural pattern of the crew.

1.5.2 Malaysia Airlines Training and Check Records

As professional pilots, the two Malaysia Airlines (MAS) flight crew were subjected to periodic checks when flying on the type of aircraft at least on a bi-annual basis to revalidate the currency of their licences. These performance checks were conducted in approved flight simulators and in

addition, further checks are conducted on route flying duties on normal commercial flights on a yearly basis.

1.5.3 Pilot-in-Command

Personal Profile – Pilot-in-Command

Sex	Male
Age	53 years
Marital Status	Married with 3 children
Date of joining MAS	15 June 1981
Licence country of issues	Malaysia
Licence type	Air Transport Pilot Licence (ATPL)
Licence number	A751
Validity Period of Licence	14 May 2014
Ratings	Boeing B777
Medical Certificate	First Class (valid until 30 June 2014)
Aeronautical experience	18423:40 hours
Experience on type	8659:40 hours
Last 24 hours	0:00:00 hours
Last 72 hours	07:00:00 hours
Last 07 days	20:39:00 hours
Last 28 days	91:04:00 hours
Last 90 days	303:09:00 hours
Last line check	08 April 2013
Instrument rating check	15 November 2013
Last proficiency	15 November 2013
Last promotion	B777 Captain (22 September 1998)

The PIC was born in the Island of Penang. He completed his Malaysian Certificate of Education (MCE) - the equivalent of the United Kingdom Ordinary (UK ‘O’) Level - at the Penang Free School, where he sat for his MCE Examination in 1978. In 1981 he was accepted as a Cadet Pilot with MAS under the sponsorship of Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA), a People’s Trust Council of the Malaysian Government.

Personal Profile of Pilot-in-Command
Sex Male Age 53 years Marital Status Married with 3 children Date of joining MAS 15 June 1981 Licence country of issues Malaysia Licence type Air Transport Pilot Licence (ATPL) Licence number A751 Validity Period of Licence 14 May 2014 Ratings Boeing B777 Medical Certificate First Class (valid until 30 June 2014) Aeronautical experience 18423:40 hours Experience on type 8659:40 hours Last 24 hours 0:00:00 hours Last 72 hours 07:00:00 hours Last 07 days 20:39:00 hours Last 28 days 91:04:00 hours Last 90 days 303:09:00 hours Last line check 08 April 2013 Instrument rating check 15 November 2013 Last proficiency 15 November 2013 Last promotion B777 Captain (22 September 1998)

The PIC was sent to Manila in the Philippines to be provided ab-initio pilot training and graduated 2 years later with a Commercial Pilot Licence & Instrument Rating (CPL & IR). He joined MAS as a Second Officer in 1983 and was posted on the F27 where he obtained his initial airline flying experience. He was then posted to the B737-200 in 1985, thereafter the A300B4, and stayed on as First Officer (FO) until March 1990. In July 1990

he was promoted to captain and took his first command on the F50 aircraft.

By the end of 1991 he was promoted to Captain on the B737-400 until December 1996. His next promotion was to the A330-300 and stayed on the fleet until September 1998 when he was promoted to the B777- 200ER fleet until the day of the event. By virtue of his good track record and seniority he was made a Type Rating Instructor (TRI) and Type Rating Examiner (TRE) on this present fleet effective November 2007.

The PIC’s flying record for the last 72 hours and preceding 28 days’ cycle were well within the Company’s specified limits. His last flight as an operating PIC was to Denpasar, Bali, in the Republic of Indonesia on 03 March 2014. This was a daily return flight with a sector time of approximately 3 hours. On the day of the event, he was conducting training for the FO who was functionally checked out.
Royal Malaysia Police’s Report on Flight Simulator of PIC
The Royal Malaysia Police (RMP) seized the PIC’s home flight simulator from the residence of the PIC on 15 March 2014.

The RMP Forensic Report dated 19 May 2014 documented more than 2,700 coordinates retrieved from separate file fragments and most of them are default game coordinates. It was also discovered that there were seven ‘manually programmed’ waypoint4 coordinates (Figure [below), that when connected 1.5A together, will create a flight path from KLIA to an area south of the Indian Ocean through the Andaman Sea. These coordinates were stored in the Volume Shadow Information (VSI) file dated 03 February 2014. The function of this file was to save information when a computer is left idle for more than 15 minutes. Hence, the RMP Forensic Report could not determine if the waypoints came from one or more files.

The RMP Forensic Report on the simulator also did not find any data that showed the aircraft was performing climb, attitude or heading manoeuvres, nor did they find any data that showed a similar route flown by MH370.

The RMP Forensic Report concluded that there were no unusual activities other than game-related flight simulations.

4 ‘Manually programmed waypoints’ - Manually programmed waypoints are waypoints that are not published in Airway Charts 27

‘Waypoints’ Figure 1.5A - Snapshot of Seven Manually Programmed

Source: Royal Malaysia Police

1.5.4 First Officer

Personal Profile – First Officer

Sex	Male
Age	27 years
Marital Status	Single
Date of joining MAS	23 July 2007
Licence type	Air Transport Pilot Licence (ATPL)
Licence number	A3550
Validity Period of Licence	26 July 2014
Ratings	Boeing B777
Medical Certificate	First Class (valid until 31 October 2014)
Aeronautical experience	2813:42 hours
Experience on type	39:11 hours
Last 24 hours	0:00:00 hours
Last 72 hours	0:00:00 hours
Last 07 days	28:47:00 hours
Last 28 days	51:17:00 hours
Last 90 days	158:46:00 hours
Last line check*	22 July 2013 (A330)
Instrument rating check*	04 December 2012 (A330)
Last proficiency	26 January 2014
Last promotion	B777 FO (04 November 2013)

The FO was born in the State of Kelantan and had his basic primary education in Segamat, Johor. He completed his secondary Education in Maktab Rendah Sains MARA (MRSM) or MARA Junior Science College, in Taiping, Perak, where he left in 2004 with the Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia (SPM) or Malaysia Certificate of Education, which is equivalent to the UK ‘O’ Level. He was accepted as a MAS Cadet Pilot and completed his flying training at the Langkawi Aerospace Training Centre, Langkawi in 2008.

His first fleet posting was on the B737-400 as a Second Officer until May 2010 He was promoted to FO in May 2010 and was on the fleet until August 2012. Between the end of 2012 to November 2013, he was promoted to the A330- 300 and the B777-200.

On the day of the flight, he was operating his last training flight before he was scheduled to be checked out on his next scheduled flight. His flying record for the last 72 hours and preceding 28 days cycle were well within the Company’s specified limits. His previous flight as a functional FO under Line Training, was to Frankfurt, Germany, on 01 March 2014 and he returned to Malaysia on 02 March 2014. All his required licences and certificates were valid when he was assigned to operate this flight to Beijing.

Personal Profile of First Officer
Sex Male Age 27 years Marital Status Single Date of joining MAS 23 July 2007 Licence type Air Transport Pilot Licence (ATPL) Licence number A3550 Validity Period of Licence 26 July 2014 Ratings Boeing B777 Medical Certificate First Class (valid until 31 October 2014) Aeronautical experience 2813:42 hours Experience on type 39:11 hours Last 24 hours 0:00:00 hours Last 72 hours 0:00:00 hours Last 07 days 28:47:00 hours Last 28 days 51:17:00 hours Last 90 days 158:46:00 hours check* 22 July 2013 (A330) Last line 04 December 2012 (A330) check* Instrument rating Last proficiency 26 January 2014 Last promotion B777 FO (04 November 2013)

* No record on B777

1.5.5 Summary of Work Schedule for Flight Crew of MH370

A summary of the work schedule for the PIC and the FO, three months prior to the eventful flight, is available in 1.5A (below). Table

Table 1.5A – Summary of Work Schedule for Flight Crew of MH370

Table 1.5A – Summary of Work Schedule for Flight Crew of MH370
Rank	24	72	7	28	90	SEP Validity
	Hours		Days
Pilot-in- Command	0:00:00	07:00:00	20:39:00	91:04:00	303:09:00	14 May 2014
First Officer	0:00:00	0:00:00	28:47:00	51:17:00	158:46:00	26 July 2014

Rank 24 72 7 28 90 SEP Validity Hours Days Pilot-in- 0:00:00 07:00:00 20:39:00 91:04:00 303:09:00 14 May 2014 Command First 0:00:00 0:00:00 28:47:00 51:17:00 158:46:00 26 July 2014 Officer Table 1.5A - 3 Months Work Schedule of PIC and FO

1.5.6 Cabin Crew and Personal Profiles

Personal Profiles – Cabin Crew

Sex	Male
Age	55 years
Marital status	Married with 4 children
Date of Joining MAS	19 November 1979
Aircraft Ratings	A330/B777/B747
Crew Performance Appraisal	Rating: 4
Validity period of licence	28 April 2014
Aeronautical experience	35 years
Medical History	43 days medical leave including 6 days hospitalisation in 2013
Last 24 hours	0:00:00 hours
Last 72 hours	8:00:00 hours
Last 07 days	19:44:00 hours
Last 28days	82:43:00 hours
Last 90 days	305:06:00 hours
Last promotion	IFS (27 March 2000)

Sex	Male
Age	49 years
Marital status	Married with 2 children
Date of Joining MAS	13 November 1989
Aircraft Ratings	A330/B777/A380
Crew Performance Appraisal	Rating 4
Validity period of licence	26 June 2014
Aeronautical experience	25 years
Last 24 hours	0:00:00 hours
Last 72 hours	0:00:00 hours
Last 07 days	30:56:00 hours
Last 28 days	124:35:00 hours
Last 90 days	408:32:00 hours
Last promotion	CS (06 March 2000)

Sex	Female
Age	49 years
Marital status	Married with a child
Date of Joining MAS	02 January 1990
Aircraft Ratings	A330/B777/A380
Crew Performance Appraisal	Rating 5
Validity period of licence	23 October 2014
Aeronautical experience	24 years
Last 24 hours	0:00:00 hours
Last 72 hours	0:00:00 hours
Last 7 days	30:55:00 hours
Last 28 days	118:02:00 hours
Last 90 days	355:23:00 hours
Last promotion	CSS (22 October 2003)

Sex	Male
Age	42 years
Marital status	Married with 4 children
Date of Joining MAS	05 October 1995
Aircraft Ratings	B737/B777/A380
Crew Performance Appraisal	Rating 4
Validity period of licence	22 August 2014
Aeronautical experience	19 years
Last 24 hours	00:00:00 hours
Last 72 hours	10:47:00 hours
Last 7 days	38:38:00 hours
Last 28 days	106:10:00 hours
Last 90 days	365:51:00 hours
Last promotion	LS (28 May 2005)

Sex	Female
Age	42 Years
Marital status	Married with 2 children
Date of Joining MAS	18 August 1992
Aircraft Ratings	B737/B777/A380
Crew Performance Appraisal	Rating 5
Validity period of licence	01 November2014
Aeronautical experience	22 years
Last 24 hours	0:00:00 hours
Last 72 hours	11:36:00 hours
Last 7 days	41:27:00 hours
Last 28 days	140:11:00 hours
Last 90 days	443:23:00 hours
Last promotion	LSS (09 May 2004)

Sex	Female
Age	42 years
Marital status	Married with 2 children
Date of Joining MAS	18 January 1992
Aircraft Ratings	A330/B777/A380
Crew Performance Appraisal	Rating 4
Validity period of licence	27 June 2014
Aeronautical experience	22 years
Last 24 hours	0:00:00 hours
Last 72 hours	9:39:00 hours
Last 7 days	34:22:00 hours
Last 28 days	93:50:00 hours
Last 90 days	327:18:00 hours
Last promotion	FSS wide-body aircraft (18 January 1993)

Sex	Female
Age	39 years
Marital status	Married with 2 children
Date of Joining MAS	16 April 1996
Aircraft Ratings	A330/B777/A380
Crew Performance Appraisal	Rating 4
Validity period of licence	11 May 2014
Aeronautical experience	18 years
Last 24 hours	0:00:00 hours
Last 72 hours	0:00:00 hours
Last 7 days	16:12:00 hours
Last 28 days	112:11:00 hours
Last 90 days	323:55:00 hours
Last promotion	FSS Wide-body aircraft (01 October 2001)

Sex	Male
Age	46 years
Marital status	Married with 3 children
Date of Joining MAS	16 April 1996
Aircraft Ratings	B737/B777/A380
Crew Performance Appraisal	Rating 5
Validity period of licence	24 October 2014
Aeronautical experience	18 years
Last 24 hours	0:00:00 hours
Last 72 hours	11:02:00 hours
Last 7 days	30:58:00 hours
Last 28 days	119:27:00 hours
Last 90 days	429:15:00 hours
Last promotion	FS Wide-body aircraft (03 December 2001)

Sex	Male
Age	41 years
Marital status	Married with 2 children
Date of Joining MAS	13 February 1997
Aircraft Ratings	B737/B777/A380
Crew Performance Appraisal	Rating 5
Validity period of licence	03 November 2014
Aeronautical experience	17 years
Last 24 hours	0:00:00 hours
Last 72 hours	0:00:00 hours
Last 7 days	30:36:00 hours
Last 28 days	122:22:00 hours
Last 90 days	391:20:00 hours
Last promotion	FS Wide-body aircraft (15 February 2002)

Sex	Male
Age	34 years
Marital status	Married with 2 children
Date of Joining MAS	27 September 2001
Aircraft Ratings	B737/B777/A380
Crew Performance Appraisal	Rating 5
Validity period of licence	06 February 2015
Aeronautical experience	13 years
Last 24 hours	0:00:00 hours
Last 72 hours	10:47:00 hours
Last 7 days	26:24:00 hours
Last 28 days	125:01:00 hours
Last 90 days	435:43:00 hours

The cabin crews’ flying experiences spread from 13 years for the most junior member to 35 years for the most senior member. A review of their records in MAS reveals that all certificates, which include Safety Emergency Procedures (SEP) training, Crew Resource Management (CRM), Safety Awareness Programme (SAP), are valid as per the requirement stated in

the Company’s document. CRM & SAP incorporate Human Factors as part of the training modules. The flying records which were monitored by the Scheduling Office indicated that all the cabin crew were well-rested before operating the flight.

In-flight Supervisor (IFS)
Sex Male Age 55 years Marital status Married with 4 children Date of Joining MAS 19 November 1979 Aircraft Ratings A330/B777/B747 Crew Performance Appraisal Rating: 4 Validity period of licence 28 April 2014 Aeronautical experience 35 years Medical History 43 days medical leave including 6 days hospitalisation in 2013 Last 24 hours 0:00:00 hours Last 72 hours 8:00:00 hours Last 07 days 19:44:00 hours Last 28days 82:43:00 hours Last 90 days 305:06:00 hours Last promotion IFS (27 March 2000)
Chief Steward (CS)
Sex Male Age 49 years Marital status Married with 2 children Date of Joining MAS 13 November 1989 Aircraft Ratings A330/B777/A380 Crew Performance Appraisal Rating 4 Validity period of licence 26 June 2014 Aeronautical experience 25 years Last 24 hours 0:00:00 hours Last 72 hours 0:00:00 hours Last 07 days 30:56:00 hours Last 28 days 124:35:00 hours Last 90 days 408:32:00 hours Last promotion CS (06 March 2000)
Chief Stewardess (CSS)
Sex Female Age 49 years Marital status Married with a child Date of Joining MAS 02 January 1990 Aircraft Ratings A330/B777/A380 Crew Performance Appraisal Rating 5 Validity period of licence 23 October 2014 Aeronautical experience 24 years Last 24 hours 0:00:00 hours Last 72 hours 0:00:00 hours Last 7 days 30:55:00 hours Last 28 days 118:02:00 hours Last 90 days 355:23:00 hours Last promotion CSS (22 October 2003)
Leading Steward (LS)
Sex Male Age 42 years Marital status Married with 4 children Date of Joining MAS 05 October 1995 Aircraft Ratings B737/B777/A380 Crew Performance Appraisal Rating 4 Validity period of licence 22 August 2014 Aeronautical experience 19 years Last 24 hours 00:00:00 hours Last 72 hours 10:47:00 hours Last 7 days 38:38:00 hours Last 28 days 106:10:00 hours Last 90 days 365:51:00 hours Last promotion LS (28 May 2005)
Leading Stewardess (LSS)
Sex Female Age 42 Years Marital status Married with 2 children Date of Joining MAS 18 August 1992 Aircraft Ratings B737/B777/A380 Crew Performance Appraisal Rating 5 Validity period of licence 01 November2014 Aeronautical experience 22 years Last 24 hours 0:00:00 hours Last 72 hours 11:36:00 hours Last 7 days 41:27:00 hours Last 28 days 140:11:00 hours Last 90 days 443:23:00 hours Last promotion LSS (09 May 2004)
Flight Stewardess (FSS) 1
Sex Female Age 42 years Marital status Married with 2 children Date of Joining MAS 18 January 1992 Aircraft Ratings A330/B777/A380 Crew Performance Appraisal Rating 4 Validity period of licence 27 June 2014 Aeronautical experience 22 years Last 24 hours 0:00:00 hours Last 72 hours 9:39:00 hours Last 7 days 34:22:00 hours Last 28 days 93:50:00 hours Last 90 days 327:18:00 hours Last promotion FSS wide-body aircraft (18 January 1993)
Flight Stewardess (FSS) 2
Sex Female Age 39 years Marital status Married with 2 children Date of Joining MAS 16 April 1996 Aircraft Ratings A330/B777/A380 Crew Performance Appraisal Rating 4 Validity period of licence 11 May 2014 Aeronautical experience 18 years Last 24 hours 0:00:00 hours Last 72 hours 0:00:00 hours Last 7 days 16:12:00 hours Last 28 days 112:11:00 hours Last 90 days 323:55:00 hours Last promotion FSS Wide-body aircraft (01 October 2001)
Flight Steward (FS) 1
Sex Male Age 46 years Marital status Married with 3 children Date of Joining MAS 16 April 1996 Aircraft Ratings B737/B777/A380 Crew Performance Appraisal Rating 5 Validity period of licence 24 October 2014 Aeronautical experience 18 years Last 24 hours 0:00:00 hours Last 72 hours 11:02:00 hours Last 7 days 30:58:00 hours Last 28 days 119:27:00 hours Last 90 days 429:15:00 hours Last promotion FS Wide-body aircraft (03 December 2001)
Flight Steward (FS) 2
Sex Male Age 41 years Marital status Married with 2 children Date of Joining MAS 13 February 1997 Aircraft Ratings B737/B777/A380 Crew Performance Appraisal Rating 5 Validity period of licence 03 November 2014 Aeronautical experience 17 years Last 24 hours 0:00:00 hours Last 72 hours 0:00:00 hours Last 7 days 30:36:00 hours Last 28 days 122:22:00 hours Last 90 days 391:20:00 hours Last promotion FS Wide-body aircraft (15 February 2002)
Flight Steward (FS) 3
Sex Male Age 34 years Marital status Married with 2 children Date of Joining MAS 27 September 2001 Aircraft Ratings B737/B777/A380 Crew Performance Appraisal Rating 5 Validity period of licence 06 February 2015 Aeronautical experience 13 years Last 24 hours 0:00:00 hours Last 72 hours 10:47:00 hours Last 7 days 26:24:00 hours Last 28 days 125:01:00 hours Last 90 days 435:43:00 hours

1.5.7 Disciplinary/Administrative Actions

There were no major disciplinary records on any of the flight and cabin crew. However, there were minor disciplinary issues among the cabin crew, where cautionary administrative letters were issued.

1.5.8 Financial Background and Insurance Cover

The PIC held bank accounts, two savings accounts, one current account, two national trust funds (ASB and ASN) and a joint account with his wife. He had a credit card. He was contributing to the Employees Provident Fund (EPF). There is no record of him having secured a life insurance policy. He had 2 houses, one in Shah Alam and the other in Subang Jaya. He had taken a bank loan on one of his houses and had a mortgage insurance policy on this loan. He also had 3 vehicles. His gross monthly income and out-of-pocket expenses indicated nothing unusual.

The PIC also had a trading account with an investment bank. The Central Depository System (CDS) and Trading accounts were opened since 13 February 1998 and 19 March 1998 respectively. The CDS account was inactive whereas the last transaction of the trading account was noted on 03 February 2000.

The FO had two saving accounts and a national trust fund (ASB) account. He contributed to the EPF. He owned two cars and spent money on the upkeep of his cars. He did not have much savings in his bank account. He had a life insurance policy and a mortgage insurance policy for a loan he took for his car.

The cabin crew had bank accounts and loans. However, the gross monthly income and out-of-pocket expenses indicated nothing unusual. There is also no evidence of recent or imminent significant financial transactions carried out.

1.5.9 Significant Past Medical and Medication History

The PIC had received treatment for minor medical ailments and was diagnosed as having osteoarthritis on 05 May 2007. He had a spinal injury on 28 January 2007 in a paragliding event. He sustained a fracture of 2nd the lumbar vertebra and underwent surgery on 30 January 2007 in a private health care facility. He was discharged on 05 February 2007 and went for a follow-up as advised. He was certified fit to fly in mid-2007 and went regularly for his six-monthly medical examinations for his continued

licensure as a pilot. For his pain he was noted to have taken analgesics on an irregular basis. Based on available information, he was not on any regular long-term medication for any chronic medical illness.

There was no significant health-related issue for the FO. He went regularly for his yearly medical examinations for his continued licensure to fly.

Based on the medical records from MAS, there were no unusual health- related issues for the cabin crew, except for the in-flight supervisor who had a history of first onset of seizures on 09 June 2013. He was admitted on the same day in a private health care facility and was treated by a Consultant Neurologist. He was discharged on 14 June 2013 and went for a follow-up as advised. He had not experienced any further seizures since his discharge. He was certified fit to fly on 06 August 2013.

1.5.10 Psychological and Social Events

The PIC’s ability to handle stress at work and home was reported to be good. There was no known history of apathy, anxiety, or irritability. There were no significant changes in his lifestyle, interpersonal conflict or family stresses.

Similarly, the FO’s ability and professional approach to work was reported to be good. This was evident with the rapid fleet promotion within 3 years as a professional pilot. There were no reports on recent changes in his behaviour or lifestyle.

1.5.11 Behavioural Events

There were no behavioural signs of social isolation, change in habits or interest, self-neglect, drug or alcohol abuse of the PIC, FO and the cabin crew.

The CCTV recordings at KLIA on 07 March 2014 were evaluated to assess the behavioural pattern of the PIC, and the FO from the time of arrival at KLIA until boarding time.

Three previous CCTV recordings of the movements of the PIC in KLIA were also viewed to see the behavioural pattern and were compared with the CCTV recordings on 07 March 2014.

The PIC’s movement was captured on CCTV at KLIA on the following days:

07 March 2014 - To Beijing
03 March 2014 - To Denpasar • • 26 February 2014 - To Melbourne • 21 February 2014 - To Beijing

On studying the PIC’s behavioural pattern on the CCTV recordings on the day of the flight and prior 3 flights there were no significant behavioural changes observed. On all the CCTV recordings the appearance was similar, i.e. well-groomed and attired. The gait, posture, facial expressions and mannerism were his normal characteristics.

The FO’s movement captured on CCTV at KLIA on 07 March 2014 was observed. The FO’s behavioural pattern on CCTV recordings on the day of the flight showed no significant behavioural changes.

1.5.12 Voice Recognition of the Radio Transmissions between MH370 and Air Traffic Control

The radio transmissions made between MH370 and the air traffic control were studied. The Team used pilot friends, family members, and an expert report of objective analysis of the radio transmissions in the voice recognition of the transmissions made between MH370 and air traffic control.

Five sets of audio recordings were analysed starting from Airway Clearance Delivery at 1625:52 UTC [0025:52 MYT] till the last utterance from Lumpur Radar at 1719:30 UTC [0119:30 MYT]. There was a total of 23 utterances as follows:

No. Audio Recordings Frequency Utterances (MHz) 1. Airway Clearance Delivery (ACD) 126.0  4  2. Lumpur Ground (LG) 122.27 6  3. Lumpur Tower (LT) 118.8 4  4. Approach Radar (AR) 121.25 3 5. Lumpur Radar (LR) 132.5  6

From the information available, the first 3 sets of audio recordings (ACD, LG, LT), the speech segments are those of the FO before take-off, and the 4th & 5th (AR & LR) sets of the audio recordings originated from the PIC after take- off.

1.6 AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

1.6.1 Airframe Manufacturer Boeing Company Model 777-2H6ER Serial Number 28420 Manufacturer’s Line No. 404 Variable No. WB175 Registration 9M-MRO Date of manufacture 29 May 2002 Date of delivery to MAS Delivered new on 31 May 2002 Certificate of Airworthiness M.0938 valid to 02 June 2014 Certificate of registration M.1124 issued 23 August 2006. Replacement of Certificate issued on 17 June 2002 Last Maintenance check A1 Check on 23 February 2014 at 53,301:17 hours and 7,494 cycles Total airframe hours/cycles 53,471.6 hours/7,526 cycles (as of 07 March 2014)

1.6.2 Engine Manufacturer Rolls-Royce Model RB211 Trent 892B-17 Engine 1 (Left) Serial Number 51463 Date of Construction November 2004 Date Installed 08 May 2013 Last Shop Visit 06 September 2010 to 21 November 2010 Time in Service 40,779 hours, 5,574 cycles (as of 07 March 2014) Engine 2 (Right) Serial Number 51462 Date of Construction October 2004 Date Installed 15 June 2010 Last Shop Visit 05 February 2010 to 14 April 2010 Time in Service 40,046 hours, 5,508 cycles (as of 07 March 2014)

1.6.3 Auxiliary Power Unit Manufacturer Allied Signal Model GTCP 331-500B Serial Number P1196 APU Hours 22,093 (as of 07 March 2014)

1.6.4 Airworthiness and Maintenance

The aircraft, Serial Number 28420, was issued with a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Export Certificate of Airworthiness No: E370249 on 29 May 2002 and placed on the Malaysian aircraft register as 9M-MRO on 03 June 2002. Ownership of the aircraft, as stated on the Certification of Registration (C of R), was Malaysian Airline System Berhad. The ownership was subsequently changed to Aircraft Business Malaysia Sdn. Bhd., as the lessor, and leased and operated by MAS. A new C of R to reflect the new owner was issued on 17 June 2002.

A Certificate of Airworthiness (C of A) in the ‘PRIVATE’ category was initially issued on 03 June 2002. The aircraft was then flown to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia where a C of A in ‘TRANSPORT PASSENGER’ category was issued by the DCA Malaysia on 12 June 2002 after the pre-service modifications were accomplished.

The C of A was subjected to annual renewal by DCA Malaysia and its renewal was subjected to compliance to the DCA Malaysia Airworthiness Notice No. 2 - Certificate of Airworthiness Renewal Procedure. The operator was required to declare the aircraft, engine, APU and equipment maintenance status as per the approved Maintenance Schedule, and that they complied with all the mandatory inspections and modifications originating from the State of Manufacture and State of Registry. The Quality Assurance Department of MAS was required to submit an ‘Aircraft Physical Inspection for the Purpose of C of A Issue/Renewal’ prior to the expiry of the C of A. An ‘Aircraft Survey Report for Certificate of Airworthiness’ will be issued by the DCA Inspector after a satisfactory physical inspection on the aircraft has been carried out. At times, the physical aircraft inspection has to coincide with the aircraft scheduled check at base or line maintenance.

The last C of A document review by DCA Inspector was carried out on 15 May 2013 for the C of A renewal and the aircraft physical inspection was carried out by MAS Quality Assurance Engineer (QAE) on 12 April 2013. The only inspection defect noted was a torn left hand flaperon inboard seal which was subsequently replaced. The aircraft C of A was renewed with no airworthiness issues identified.

Aircraft Maintenance Schedule
Brief description of the sections follows:
1. Section 1 The definition and introduction of the routine check types. Check intervals and limitations at which the maintenance tasks are to be carried out.
2. Section 2
  Task Maintenance Requirements relating to on-wing tasks or tasks to be performed on parts after removal from the aircraft, their intervals and control in the routine maintenance check or independently.
3. Section 3 Component Maintenance Requirements on tasks to be performed on components, their intervals and controlled independently.
4. Section 4
  Registers all the applicable job cards which are tied up to the maintenance Checks or Phases of inspections or tasks. The job cards/task cards cover the system, power plants, structural and zonal tasks.
  
  The Master document of the approved Maintenance Schedule is stored in the Engineering Maintenance System (EMS) computer system bank and subject to regular revisions.
  
  In addition to the Maintenance Schedule, a Supplementary Maintenance Schedule covered MAS’ own generated tasks, non-mandatory manufacturer/vendor recommended tasks and non-airworthiness items.
  
  The Maintenance check cycles are translated into the routine Transit Check, Stayover Check, Equalised ‘A’ Check, ‘C’ Check, ‘C Extended’ Check and ‘D’ Check. (below) summarises the maintenance check Table 1.6A intervals.
  
  Transit Stay-over A C CX D Check Check (Extended) C heck Check Whenever 6 hours In 4 parts In 2 parts 52 months 8 years aircraft is planned A1 thru A4 C1 and C2 on transit or 12 hours unplanned A1 to A2 • C1 to C2 • = 550 hours = 13 months A2 to A3 • C2 to C1 • = 550 hours = 13 months A3 to A4 • = 550 hours A4 to A1 • = 550 hours

Table 1.6A - Maintenance Check Intervals

Table 1.6A – Routine Maintenance Check Types and Intervals for B777 Aircraft (9M-MRO)
Transit	Stay-over	A Check	C Check	CX (Extended) Check	D C heck
Whenever aircraft is on transit	6 hours planned or 12 hours unplanned	In 4 parts A1 thru A4 • A1 to A2 = 550 hours • A2 to A3 = 550 hours • A3 to A4 = 550 hours • A4 to A1 = 550 hours	In 2 parts C1 and C2 • C1 to C2 = 13 months • C2 to C1 = 13 months	52 months	8 years

No. Type of Date of aircraft Checks Airframe Landing Aircraft Checks Hours Cycles 1. A1 23 February 2014 53,301:17 7,494

2. A4 14 - 16 January 2014 52,785:37 7,422

3. A3 13 December 2013 52,323:00 7,359

4. A2 04 November 2013 51,766:29 7,282

5. C1 and A1 29 August-26 September 2013 51,270:15 7,208

6. A4 24 - 25 July 2013 50,810:19 7,132

7. A3 19 June 2013 50,372:07 7,069

8. A2 14 May 2013 49,840:28 6,994

9. A1 04 April 2013 49,331:52 6,910

10. A4 19 - 20 February 2013 48,836:23 6,840

11. A3 10 January 2013 48,291:37 6,766

12. A2 03 December 2012 47,749:39 6,693

13. A1 25 October 2012 47,214:27 6,617

14. A1, A4 and C2 06 - 22 July 2012 46,727:16 6,552

Table 1.6B – Recent Maintenance Check History for 9M-MRO

Table 1.6B – Recent Maintenance Check History for 9M-MRO
No.	Type of Aircraft Checks	Date of aircraft Checks	Airframe Hours	Landing Cycles
1.	A1	23 February 2014	53,301:17	7,494
2.	A4	14 - 16 January 2014	52,785:37	7,422
3.	A3	13 December 2013	52,323:00	7,359
4.	A2	04 November 2013	51,766:29	7,282
5.	C1 and A1	29 August-26 September 2013	51,270:15	7,208
6.	A4	24 - 25 July 2013	50,810:19	7,132
7.	A3	19 June 2013	50,372:07	7,069
8.	A2	14 May 2013	49,840:28	6,994
9.	A1	04 April 2013	49,331:52	6,910
10.	A4	19 - 20 February 2013	48,836:23	6,840
11.	A3	10 January 2013	48,291:37	6,766
12.	A2	03 December 2012	47,749:39	6,693
13.	A1	25 October 2012	47,214:27	6,617
14.	A1, A4 and C2	06 - 22 July 2012	46,727:16	6,552
15.	A4, C2, CX and D	25 May - 26 June 2010	37,014:15	5,304

A review of the maintenance records for 9M-MRO revealed the following sequence of recent checks (Table [above]) carried out by MAS prior 1.6B to the disappearance of the aircraft on the 08 March 2014. No significant defects were noted during the checks including the turn-around transit checks.

The Maintenance Schedule incorporated the Structural Inspection Programme based on the B777 Maintenance Review Board Report and B777 Maintenance Planning Document, which are categorised as Structural Inspection Items, Corrosion Prevention and Control Items and Fatigue Related Inspection Items. Inspection findings would be evaluated by the MAS Reliability Section of the Technical Services Department and the department would recommend any follow-up actions as necessary and report to Boeing Company of all significant structural discrepancies.

The Maintenance Schedule also included compliance procedures for Directives5, (AWL)6 Airworthiness Airworthiness Limitations and Structural Inspections with Provisions for Damage Tolerance Rating. It also included Certification Maintenance Requirement Compliance to the Extended Twin (ETOPS)7 Engine Operations operational approval, which was obtained from DCA Malaysia. The MAS B777 ETOPS Maintenance Manual specified the maintenance policies, procedures and requirements for ETOPS operations. A policy to prevent the same personnel to perform or certify certain tasks on multiple similar systems at the same downtime is stipulated. ETOPS task intervals cannot be exceeded. If a concession is given for a check that contains ETOPS task or for individual ETOPS task, the aircraft must be downgraded to non-ETOPS status. 9M-MRO was approved and had no limitations for ETOPS operations at the time of departure from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing. It was not on an ETOPS flight plan. MAS and its fleet of B777 were approved for Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum (RVSM) operation.

5 An AD is a notification to owners and operators of certified aircraft that a known safety deficiency with a particular model of aircraft, engine, avionics or other system exists and must be corrected. It is mandatory in nature. 6 AWLs are items that the Certificate process has defined as critical from a fatigue or damage tolerance assessment. 7 ETOPS is an aviation rule that allows twin-engine airliners to fly long distance routes that were previously off- limits to twin-engine aircraft. 43

Major Repair
There was an entry in the Aircraft Log Book on 09 August 2012 that the aircraft right wing tip was damaged during taxiing at Pudong, Shanghai Airport. The aircraft collided with a China Eastern Airlines A340-600, registered B-6050. The right wing tip of 9M-MRO ran into the left horizontal stabilizer of B-6050. Part of the aircraft wing tip was ruptured and stuck at the left elevator of the B-6050. and Figures 1.6A (below) show the wing tip damages. 1.6B

Figure 1.6A - Right Wing Tip Damage

Figure 1.6B - Damaged Wing Tip

Boeing produced an Aircraft Survey Report reference WB175/W8134/LN404 on 15 August 2012 and the repair was carried out by Boeing Aircraft-On-Ground (AOG) Team at Pudong, Boeing Shanghai facility from 22 September to 03 October 2012. The Boeing repair scheme was approved under DCA Malaysia’s Statement of Compliance (SOC) Reference Number SC/2012/081 issued on 03 September 2012. At the time of the incident, the recorded airframe hours were at 46,975:43 and landing cycles at 6,585.

tolerance8 There was a requirement for damage information to be incorporated in the aircraft maintenance programme within 24 months from 02 October 2012 as stated in the FAA Form - Organization Designation Authorization (ODA). This damage tolerance information was not yet included in the maintenance programme for the aircraft at the time of the occurrence.
Cabin Configuration Change
The fleet of B777 of MAS went through a cabin interior retrofit programme which converted the configuration from 12 First Class seats/33 Business Class seats/233 Economy Class seats to 35 Business Class and 247 Economy Class seats. On 9M-MRO, this re- configuration started on 17 August 2006 and was completed on 08 September 2006. The modification was approved under FAA Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) No. STO1493SE dated 24 January 2005 and DCA’s SOC No. SC2004/98.
Mandatory Occurrence Reports
A review of the Mandatory Occurrence Reports (MORs) for the B777 fleet raised by the Engineering & Maintenance Quality Assurance Department of MAS revealed that only one was raised for 9M-MRO, and this was related to the right wing tip damage stated above. A total of 77 MORs were raised for the MAS fleet of 17 B777 aircraft. MORs raised by the Quality Assurance department are primarily related to technical issues with the fleet. The average age of the B777 fleet as of 01 March 2014 was 14.35 years. 9M-MRO was 11.75 years old.

8 Damage tolerance means that the structure has been evaluated to ensure that should serious fatigue, corrosion or accidental damage occurs within the operational life of the aircraft, the remaining structure can withstand reasonable loads without failure or excessive structural deformation until the damage is detected. 45
Airworthiness Directives
Maintenance and Inspection records provided by MAS indicated that at the time the aircraft 9M-MRO went missing, the aircraft and engines were fully compliant with all applicable Airworthiness Directives (AD).

The most recent AD, which was accomplished on 17 January 2014, was FAA AD 2012-13-05 which made mandatory the accomplishment of Boeing Service Bulletin 777-35A0027 which requires replacement of low pressure oxygen hoses in the cockpit. The changes provided in the service bulletin are to prevent damage to the low pressure oxygen hoses that may be subjected to electrical current. An electrical current condition in the low pressure oxygen hose can cause the low pressure oxygen hose to melt or burn. This could result in smoke and/or fire in the flight compartment. An operator (not MAS) reported that a fire originated near the first officer's area which caused extensive damage to the cockpit. One scenario of the causes being considered is that an electrical fault or short circuit resulted in electrical heating of the low pressure oxygen hoses in the flight crew oxygen system. This service bulletin is to replace low pressure oxygen hoses with non-conductive low pressure oxygen hoses located in the cockpit. The replacement of the low pressure oxygen hoses will prevent electrical current from passing through the low pressure oxygen hose internal anti-collapse spring which can cause the low pressure oxygen hose to melt or burn.

An FAA AD 2014-05-03 was issued and became effective on 09 April 2014. This AD made mandatory the accomplishment of Boeing Service Bulletin 777-53A0068 which addresses a crack in the fuselage skin under the SATCOM antenna adapter. The Service Bulletin was issued on 12 June 2013. The AD was issued to detect and correct cracking and corrosion in the fuselage skin, which could lead to rapid decompression and loss of structural integrity of the aircraft. However, this AD was not applicable to 9M-MRO as the location and configuration of the antenna on the aircraft, as delivered by Boeing ex- production, were different and not affected by the issues highlighted in the Service Bulletin.
Technical Log
1. MR1 and MR2
  The MAS Technical Log Book was divided into Maintenance Report 1 (MR1) and Maintenance Report 2 (MR2). The MR1 has provision for the flight crew to enter any aircraft defects for each flight phase. It can also be used to enter maintenance required and rectifications by the Licenced Aircraft Maintenance Engineers (LAME) or Approval Holders, or defer defects within the Minimum Equipment List (MEL) procedures to the Maintenance Report 2 (MR2) section.
  
  A review of the Technical Log entries for 9M-MRO since the last D check in June 2010 did not reveal any significant defects or trend.
  
  The most recent entries made in the Technical Log Book for 9M-MRO are listed in Appendix 1.6A.
2. Oxygen System Replenishment
  A Technical Log entry of interest, made on 07 March 2014, is the replenishment of crew oxygen system. This replenishment was reviewed in detail together with information gathered from the interview of the LAME who performed the task. Replenishment (servicing) of the crew oxygen system is a routine procedure, carried out before the minimum pressure required for departure is reached, usually carried out during a Stayover check. The minimum pressure for despatch as per the MAS Minimum Equipment List (MEL) is 310 psi at 35°C for 2-man crew and with a 2-cylinder configuration (as installed on MAS B777 fleet).
  
  It has been the practice of the airline to service the oxygen system whenever time permits, even if the pressure is above the minimum required for despatch.
  
  During the Stayover check on 07 March 2014, the servicing on 9M-MRO was performed by the LAME with the assistance of a mechanic, as the pressure reading was 1120 psi. The servicing was normal and nothing unusual was noticed. There was no leak in the oxygen system and the decay in pressure from the nominal value of 1850 psi was not unusual. The system was topped up to 1800 psi. Before this servicing, maintenance records showed that
  
  the system was last serviced on 14 January 2014 during an A4 check.
  
  A small amount of oxygen is normally expended during pre-departure checks of the oxygen masks by the flight crew. Oxygen pressure is also dissipated by a bleed valve in the system for a few seconds during engine start following the end of a flight.
Deferred Defects (Maintenance Report 2)

A review of the aircraft records from the MAS Maintenance Control Centre (MCC) showed that the following defects were outstanding on 9M-MRO and deferred to the Deferred Defect Log (Table 1.6C, [below]). The hole found on the right engine acoustic panel, mentioned below in item 7, was of dimension of approximately 1 inch by 1 inch and is allowed to be deferred by the B777 Maintenance Manual until permanent repair is carried out within 500 flight hours. This minor damage is considered normal wear and tear of the engine nacelles and does not pose any hazard to the engine.

Table 1.6C – Deferred Defects on 9M-MRO

Table 1.6C – Deferred Defects on 9M-MRO
No.	Deferred Date	Defect
1.	25 Sep 2013	To carry out installation test for aft water quantity gauge.
2.	31 Oct 2013	In-Flight Entertainment (IFE) Airshow does not show arrival time/time to destination logged time & problem still persists.
3.	07 Nov 2013	From Daily Engineering Operations Report (DEOR) - Right engine consumes average 1.5T more fuel per/hour compared to left engine
4.	21 Jan 2014	Toilet 3F-1L mirror light lens broken
5.	30 Jan 2014	Pre-departure F/O seat power adjustment (fwd/aft) found inoperative.
6.	05 Mar 2014	Please check alignment for left runway turn/off light.
7.	05 Mar 2014	Hole found at 6 o'clock position of the right engine acoustic panel.

Engine Health Monitoring
Engine Health Monitoring (EHM) was contracted out to Rolls Royce, the engine manufacturer. Engine data ‘snapshot’ reports were generated by the Aircraft Condition Monitoring System (ACMS) and transmitted via ACARS to MAS, who then submitted them to Rolls Royce for analysis on its behalf. The transmitted engine parameters primarily used to assess engine health are:
- Turbine Gas Temperature
- Shaft Speeds
- Shaft Vibration (Low Pressure, Intermediate Pressure and High Pressure)
- Oil Pressure
- Oil Temperature

The EHM system trend reports over the last 3 months which covered ‘snapshot’ data points gathered at take-off, climb and cruise received through the ACMS show no evidence of unusual engine behaviour for both engines. On the occurrence flight, 2 EHM reports were transmitted; the first was a Take-off report generated at 1641:58 UTC, 07 March 2014 [0041:58 MYT, 08 March 2014] and the second was a Climb report at 1652:21 UTC, 07 March 2014 [0052:21 MYT, 08 March 2014]. Reports are transmitted by ACARS at convenient times during the flight (not necessarily at the time of generation/data capture). Both reports did not show any unusual engine behaviour. The data transmitted on these reports are shown in Appendix 1.6B - Engine Health Monitoring Reports. The ACMS will also Decoded Data for Take-off and Climb generate other pre-defined engine reports including engine parameters’ exceedance reports. However, no such EHM reports were received during the flight. Position reports are also transmitted, via ACARS, every 30 minutes. Refer to for further details. Section 1.9.4

Table 1.9A – ACARS Position Report Data Transmitted by MH370

Table 1.9A – ACARS Position Report Data Transmitted by MH370
Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) - UTC	1641:43	1646:43	1651:43	1656:43	1701:43	1706:43
Altitude (ALT) – Feet	103	10,582	21,193	28,938	34,998	35,004
Calibrated Airspeed (CAS) - Knots.	168.4	261.8	301.1	303.1	278.0	278.4
MACH	0.255	0.478	0.669	0.783	0.819	0.821
Total Air Temperature (TAT) - °C	31.1	23.4	11.6	2.5	-13.4	-13.1
Static Air Temperature (SAT) - °C	27.3	10.4	-11.8	-27.4	-43.9	-43.8
Latitude (LAT)	2.667	3.074	3.553	4.109	4.708	5.299
Longitude (LONG)	101.715	101.760	01.988	102.251	102.434	102.713
Gross Weight (GWT) – lb	492,520	489,200	486,240	483,840	481,880	480,600
Total Remaining Fuel Weight (TOTFW) - kg	49,200	47,800	46,500	45,400	44,500	43,800
Wind Direction (WINDIR)	140.3	107.6	1.8	58.4	69.6	70.0
Wind Speed (WINDSP)	1.25	9.38	19.50	10.63	17.38	17.13
True Heading (THDG)	-33.5	27.7	27.8	26.0	26.8	26.7

Central Maintenance Computing System
The Central Maintenance Computing System (CMCS) collects and stores information from most of the aircraft systems. It can store fault histories as well as monitor and conduct tests on the various systems. The fault history contains details of warnings, cautions and maintenance messages.

At regular intervals, during flight, the CMCS transmits any recorded fault messages, via the ACARS, to the Maintenance Control Centre (MCC) of MAS. This helps in the planning and preparation for the rectification of any potential aircraft defects at the main base or line stations.

The traffic log of maintenance messages transmitted for the last 10 flights on 9M-MRO were reviewed. There were messages transmitted, indicating that the CMCS was functioning prior to the occurrence flight. However, no maintenance messages were transmitted during the occurrence flight. These messages are transmitted in real time that is, as the faults occur.

Maintenance messages are not displayed on the Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) in the cockpit and they are not used to determine the airworthiness of the aircraft. They provide diagnostic information useful in troubleshooting or maintenance planning. Only maintenance messages which trigger EICAS Alert messages require maintenance action (including deferment, if allowable) prior to despatch.

1.6.5 Weight and Balance

The aircraft underwent a scheduled reweighing on 28 April 2009 at the MAS maintenance facility at KLIA. The next aircraft re-weighing was due on or before 27 April 2014. The aircraft Weight Schedule dated 12 June 2009 was reviewed with the following pertinent details (also refer to Table 1.6D [below]):

Basic Empty Weight (BEW) of 138,918.7 kg Centre of Gravity (C of G) position of 1,248.8 Inches
Index of 60.07 I.U.
C of G of 26.7 % Mean Aerodynamic Chord (MAC) Dry Operating Weight (DOW) of 145,150 kg and Index 61.13
The maximum authorised take-off weight was 286,897 kg. On the occurrence flight, the aircraft departed with a calculated take-off weight of 223,469 kg. This take-off weight was broken down as follows:

50SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORT MH370 (9M-MRO)

Table 1.6D – Weight and Balance of MH370 on Departure

Table 1.6D – Weight and Balance of MH370 on Departure
	Actual (kg)	Maximum (kg)
Take-off Weight (TOW)	223,469	286,897
Zero Fuel Weight (ZFW)	174,369	195,044
Take-off Fuel	49,100	-
Landing Weight (LDW)	186,269	208,652
Trip Fuel	37,200	-
Total Traffic Load	31,086	-
Total Payload (Load in compartment)	14,296	-
Passenger & Luggage	16,790	-
Dry Operating Weight (DOW)	143,283	-

The balance corresponding to the aircraft take-off weight and shown on the final loadsheet (after Last Minute Changes) was 33.78% of the Mean Aerodynamic Chord (MAC) which was within limits.

During take-off, the aircraft Basic Empty Weight (BEW) was 138,918.7 kg and the C of G position was 1,248.8 inches (C of G MAC was 26.7%). Total moment was 173,478,288.65 kg in. This indicates the planned weight and balance of the aircraft was within the allowable limits. The planned cargo weight (load in compartment) of 14,296 kg and distribution matched the recorded cargo weight and distribution.

Based on the available data, the aircraft weight and balance for the take-off from Kuala Lumpur was found to be normal and within the allowable limits.

1.6.6 Fuel

The aircraft used Jet A-1 fuel. Following the previous flight, as per records in the Transit Check and Fuel Log, the total remaining fuel before refuelling as per the cockpit indication was 8,200 kg (Left Tank was 3,700 kg and Right Tank was 4,500 kg). Total departure fuel after refuelling was 49,700 kg (Left Tank was 24,900 kg and Right Tank was 24,800 kg) as indicated in the cockpit.

The fuel weight on board corresponded to a planned trip-fuel of 37,200 kg. Based on MH370 ATC flight plan dated 07 March 2014, the take-off fuel recorded was 49,100 kg. This figure differed slightly from the take-off fuel figure of 49,200 kg generated by the Aircraft Condition Monitoring System (ACMS) and transmitted by Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS). The difference was due to the actual time the fuel figure was taken from the aircraft fuel quantity indication system, by Operations for the load sheet, and by the ACMS for the ACARS report, 51

considering fluctuations in the fuel quantity indication. The investigation estimated that the aircraft would have had 41,500 kg fuel remaining after 41 minutes flying from KLIA to IGARI.

The last position report transmitted via ACARS at 1707:29 UTC, 07 March 2014 [0107:29 MYT, 08 March 2014] recorded remaining fuel of 43,800 kg at 35,004 ft altitude.

ATC flight plan forecast recorded remaining fuel of 11,900 kg at landing, including 7,700 kg of diversion fuel. The first alternate airport, Jinan Yaoqiang International Airport (China), was estimated to be 46 minutes from the diversion point with 4,800 kg fuel required and the second alternate airport, Hangzhou Xiaoshan International Airport (China) was estimated to be 1 hour 45 minutes with 10,700 kg fuel required.

The fuel carried on board for the flight met the regulatory requirements on the minimum required, taking into account the use of possible diversion airports. There was also no evidence that more than the reasonable amount required was carried.

1.6.7 Emergency Locator Transmitter

An emergency locator transmitter (ELT) is a radio beacon that when activated will transmit digital distress signals. These signals can be tracked in order to aid the detection and localisation of an aircraft in distress.

The Fixed and Portable ELT radio beacons interface worldwide with the international Cospas-Sarsat satellite system for Search and Rescue (SAR). When activated and under satellite coverage, such beacons send out a distress signal which can be detected by satellites. The satellite receivers send this information to ground stations. This signal is transmitted to Mission Control Centres (MCC) located in six regions worldwide. The MCC covering the Indian Ocean is managed by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority based in Canberra, Australia.

ELTs are mandatory safety items carried on board the aircraft. The cabin and the technical crew attend compulsory safety emergency procedure (SEP) training and have to remain current by attending refresher SEP courses. Operation and functioning of the ELT is part of the SEP training module.

The specifications for the ELT are contained in FAA Technical Standard Orders TSO-C126 and TSO-C91A.

The ELT is a radio beacon; like all other radio equipment installed on-board, its usage is approved by the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission through the Aircraft Radio Licence. - 9M-MRO. Appendix 1.6C Copy of the Radio Licence issued for

9M-MRO had four ELTs installed. They were located as follows:

One FIXED ELT located above ceiling of the aft passenger cabin at STA 1880.
The aircraft was delivered without a fixed ELT; this component was added by MAS later (between December 2004 and July 2005). This unit is mounted to aircraft structure at the aft passenger cabin at STA 1880.

A control switch installed in the cockpit (flight deck) aft overhead panel provides the command signal. This switch is guarded in the ARMED position. If required, the flight crew can select the ELT to ON by moving the guarded switch from ARMED to ON.

The fixed ELT is manufactured by ELTA FRANCE and is of the 406 series, part number is 01N65900. The unit is connected to an Omni- directional, triple frequency blade antenna located at the rear fuselage forward of the vertical stabilizer at station 1881. The ELT will activate upon a sudden deceleration force per the Technical Standard Order.

This ELT has the provision to operate on the satellite frequency of 406 MHz when activated. The transmission includes the ELT identifier, aircraft nationality and registration markings. It will also transmit on 121.5 MHz and 243 MHz when activated and these signals may be detected by air, sea or ground receivers. Transmissions on VHF frequency (121.5/243 MHz) are line of sight and effective only in close proximity (about 20 km radius).

The battery expiry date for the FIXED ELT was November 2014.

One PORTABLE ELT located in the forward cabin right hand coat closet.

This closet is used by the cabin crew.

This unit is bracket-mounted to the inside of the coat closet door. A label fixed on the coat closet door identifies the ELT. The installation allows quick removal. The Portable ELT is manufactured by ELTA FRANCE and is of the 406 series. It is identical to the fixed ELT except 53

that this unit has its own foldable antenna. The operations and function are the same. The manufacturer part number is 01N65910.

The portable ELT has a control switch on the front face. It is normally in the OFF position. When needed, the switch can be selected to the ON position to activate the ELT transmission.

The battery expiry date for the PORTABLE ELT was November 2014.
Two SLIDE RAFT mounted ELTs located at Door 1 Left and Door 4 Right (packed within the slide raft assembly).
The slide raft mounted ELT will only be available when the slide rafts at doors 1 Left or 4 Right are deployed. The ELT transmission is not satellite enabled. The transmission signal is on 121.5 MHz and 243 MHz which may be monitored with air, sea and ground-based receivers. The slide raft ELT is automatically armed when the slide raft is deployed and inflated. Once armed the ELT is automatically activated by a water sensor coming in contact with water. This ELT is not activated by deceleration. The slide raft ELTs (Part No.: P3-03- 0029-10) are manufactured by DME Corporation and the battery expiry dates are as follows:

Door 1 Left - August 2016 - Door 4 Right - May 2017 -

No relevant ELT beacon signals from the aircraft were reported from the responsible Search and Rescue agencies or any other aircraft.

Review of Effectiveness of Emergency Locator Transmitters
In general, Emergency Locator Transmitters (ELT) are intended for use on land or on the surface of water, and neither portable nor fixed ELT signals are detectable when the ELT is submerged in deep water. Portable ELT is equipped with a floatation device and can be activated by immersion in water. For effective signal transmission, the antenna of the ELT must remain above water. Damage to an ELT or its associated wiring and antenna, or shielding by aircraft wreckage or terrain, may also prevent or degrade transmission. If the portable ELT is activated within a closed aircraft the shielding effect of the aircraft structure may degrade the transmission.
1. A review of ICAO accident records over the last 30 years indicates that of the 114 accidents in which the status of ELTs was known, only 39 cases recorded effective ELT activation. This implies that of the total accidents in which ELTs were carried, only about 34% of the ELTs operated effectively (Appendix 1.6D).
2. The Cospas-Sarsat system has been helpful for search and rescue teams in numerous aircraft accidents on a world-wide basis. Despite these successes, the detection of ELT signals after an aircraft crash remains problematic. Several reports have identified malfunctions of the beacon triggering system, disconnection of the beacon from its antenna or destruction of the beacon as a result of accidents where aircraft was destroyed or substantially damaged. Even when the beacon and its antenna are functioning properly, signals may not be adequately transmitted to the Cospas-Sarsat satellites because of physical blockage from aircraft debris obstructing the beacon antenna or when the antenna is under water.
  Source: Global Aeronautical Distress and Safety System (GADSS document)
  
  Note : In the aftermath of the disappearance of MH370, following a multi-disciplinary meeting in May 2014, ICAO formed an Ad- hoc Working Group on Flight Tracking with the mandate to develop a Concept of Operation on the sequence of events before and after the occurrence of an accident which should include all identified phases of such a sequence including detection of an abnormal situation, alert phase, distress phase, and search and rescue activities. This Concept of Operation is GADSS.
3. ELT can be activated automatically by shock typically encountered during aircraft crashes or manually. It is possible for Flight Crew to manually activate the ELT; however existing flight operating procedures do not call for activation of the ELT until the incident has occurred.
4. The Cospas-Sarsat system does not provide a complete coverage of the earth at all times. As a consequence, beacons located outside the areas covered by these satellites at a given moment cannot be immediately detected
  and must continue to transmit until a satellite passes overhead.
5. The global distress beacon detection system, Cospas- Sarsat, no longer detects 121.5 MHz distress signals. Only 406 MHz digital distress beacons are now capable of detection by satellite. Analogue beacon signals may be received by other aircraft within VHF range but there may not be such aircraft within range at the time of beacon transmission and monitoring 121.5 MHz.

1.6.8 Aircraft Systems Description

Most of the electronic equipment on the aircraft are mounted on equipment racks in the various equipment centres.

The Main Equipment Centre (MEC) contains most of the electronics equipment on the aircraft. The MEC is below the passenger cabin, rear of the nose wheel well and forward of the forward cargo compartment. Access to the MEC is possible on ground or in flight. The equipment in the MEC includes electronics for these functions:

Information Management • • Generator Control • Transformer Rectifier Flight control and autopilot • • Environmental control • Recording Navigation • • Communication • Cabin Management • Weight and balance • Air data • Inertial data • Warning • Proximity sensing • Engine control • Electrical Load Management.

The Forward Equipment Centre is forward of the nose wheel well and contains the two weather radar receiver/transmitters. Access to the

Forward Equipment Centre is through the access door forward of the nose landing gear or through the MEC.

The passenger compartment above the Door 3 cross-aisle at station 1530 on the left of the aircraft centre line contains the satellite communication equipment.

A rack in the passenger compartment above the rear galley at station 2100 on the right side of the aircraft contains the flight recorders.

There are also equipment racks adjacent to the forward, aft and bulk cargo doors. The forward cargo racks contain the primary flight control, actuator control, radio altitude, fuel quantity and cargo handling electronics. The aft cargo racks contain the HF communication, brake and tire and main gear steering electronics. The bulk cargo racks contain the APU battery and charger.

Air Conditioning and Pressurisation
The aircraft has two air conditioning systems divided into left pack and right pack. Engine bleed air provides the pneumatic source for air conditioning and pressurisation.

There are two electronic Controllers, each of which can provide both pack and zone control. Each Controller has two channels that alternate command cycle. Cockpit and cabin temperature selection is monitored, and the Air cycle machine and temperature control valves will be commanded to deliver temperature conditioned air to the various cabin zones.

Conditioned air is also used for electronic equipment cooling. This is supplied through a series of pneumatic valves with supply and exhaust fans. Exhaust air from the equipment cooling flow is routed to the forward cargo and used for forward cargo compartment heating.

Two cabin pressure Controllers regulate the aircraft pressurisation and command the pneumatic system. System operation is automatic and works in conjunction with the forward and aft outflow valves that are used for pressurisation. The outflow valves can also be manually operated from the cockpit by switches on the overhead panel.

Loss of cabin pressure will be indicated to the flight crew by a Cabin Altitude warning message on the Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) display together with the associated aural warning.
Autopilot Flight Director System
The autopilot is engaged by operation of either of two A/P pushbutton switches on the Mode Control Panel (MCP) located on the glareshield panel (Figure [below]). Once engaged the autopilot can control 1.6C the aircraft in various modes selected on the MCP. Normal autopilot disengagement is through either control wheel autopilot disengage switch. The autopilot can disengage if the flight crew override an

Autopilot (A/P) Engage Switches

Autopilot (A/P) DISENGAGE Bar

Copyright © Boeing. Reprinted with permission of The Boeing Company

Figure 1.6C - Autopilot Mode Control Panel

autopilot command through the use of the control column, control wheel or rudder pedals (when the yaw axis is engaged for approach).

The autopilot can also be disengaged by pulling down on the A/P Disengage Bar on the MCP. The autopilot will also disengage automatically for failures of systems on which it relies upon for specific operations. The Autopilot Flight Director System (AFDS) consists of three Autopilot Flight Director Computers (AFDCs), one MCP, and six backdrive actuators (one each for the Captain’s and First Officer’s control column, control wheel, and rudder pedals). The left and right 28V DC buses power the left and right AFDCs, respectively and the MCP while the 28V DC battery bus powers the centre AFDC.

Emergency power from the Ram Air Turbine (RAT) generator does not power these busses and as a result the autopilot will not function with RAT electrical power.
1. Take-off Mode
  The Take-off (TO/GA) mode controls roll and pitch during take-off. Also, the Thrust Management Computing Function (TMCF) controls thrust during take-off. Turning a flight director on while the aircraft is on the ground, or activating either TO/GA switch while on the ground, will engage Take-off mode.
2. Roll Modes
  The following AFDS roll modes are available during climb, cruise and descent (Figure [below]): 1.6D
  1. Lateral Navigation
    Pushing the Lateral Navigation (LNAV) switch arms or disarms the LNAV mode. The commands come from the active Flight Management Computing Function (FMCF) when there is a valid navigation data base and an active flight plan.
  2. Heading Hold/Track Hold
    Pushing the Heading Hold (HDG HOLD)/Track hold (TRK HOLD) switch selects Heading or Track hold. In this mode, the aircraft holds either heading (HDG) or track (TRK). If the HDG/TRK display on the MCP shows TRK, the aircraft holds track. If the HDG/TRK display on the MCP shows HDG, the aircraft holds heading.
    
    Heading/Track (HDG/TRK) Bank Limit Lateral Navigation Heading/Track (LNAV) Switch Reference Switch Window Selector (outer)
    
    Heading/Track Heading/Track Hold Heading/Track Select Selector (middle) (HOLD) Switch (SEL) Switch (inner)
    
    Copyright © Boeing. Reprinted with permission of The Boeing Company
    
    Figure 1.6D - Lateral Mode Switches and Indicators
  3. Heading Select/Track Select
    Pushing the Heading Select (HDG SEL)/Track Select (TRK SEL) switch (inner) selects Heading Select or Track Select modes. In this mode, the aircraft turns to the heading or track that shows in the heading/track window. Pushing the Heading/Track (HDG/TRK) Reference switch alternately changes the heading/track reference between heading and track. Rotating the Heading/Track selector (middle) sets the heading or track in the heading/track window. If the HDG/TRK display shows HDG, the aircraft goes to and holds the heading that shows in the heading/track window. If the HDG/TRK display shows TRK, the aircraft goes to and holds the track that shows in the heading/track window. Rotating the Bank Limit selector (outer) sets the bank limit when in the Heading Select or Track Select modes. In the AUTO position, the limit varies between 15 - 25°, depending on True Airspeed. When the other detented positions are selected, the value is the maximum, regardless of airspeed.
  4. Roll Attitude Hold
    The Roll Attitude Hold mode is used to hold the roll attitude that exists at the time the flight director is first turned on, or the autopilot is first engaged. The Roll Attitude Hold mode is activated, and ATT annunciated, if the bank angle is greater than 5 degrees when either:
    - A flight director is turned on with the autopilot not engaged; or
    - The autopilot is initially engaged with no flight director on.
3. Pitch Modes
  The following AFDS pitch modes are available during climb, cruise and descent (Figure [below]): 1.6E
  1. Vertical Navigation
    Pushing the vertical navigation (VNAV) switch arms or disarms the VNAV mode. In this mode, the AFDS uses vertical steering commands provided by the Flight Management Computer Function (FMCF). The FMCF vertical steering commands come from the active FMCF based on the navigation data and the active flight plan.
  2. Vertical Speed/Flight Path Angle
    Pushing the Vertical Speed/Flight Path Angle (V/S-FPA) switch selects the V/S or FPA mode. Rotating the V/S-FPA selector Up or Down sets the vertical speed or flight path angle in the vertical speed/flight path angle window. Pushing the V/S-FPA Reference switch alternately changes vertical speed/flight path angle window references between vertical speed and flight path angle. The vertical speed or flight path angle command is an elevator command. The pilot uses this mode to change flight levels. The pilot must set the engine thrust necessary to hold the vertical speed or flight path angle command. When the V/S/FPA display shows V/S, the aircraft goes to and holds the vertical speed that shows on the vertical speed/flight path angle window.
    
    IAS/MACH Vertical Vertical Speed/Flight Path Reference Switch Navigation (VNAV) Switch Angle (V/S-FPA) Window
    
    V/S-FPA Reference IAS/MACH Altitude Switch Window Window
    
    IAS/MACH V/S-FPA Selector Altitude Selector Selector Flight Level Change Altitude HOLD V/S-FPA Switch (FLCH) Switch Switch
    
    Copyright © Boeing. Reprinted with permission of The Boeing Company
    
    Figure 1.6E - Vertical Mode Switches and Indicators
  3. Flight Level Change
    Pushing the Flight Level Change (FLCH) switch selects the FLCH mode. In this mode, the AFDS will control to the speed target in the IAS/MACH window, providing climb and descent guidance and control. FLCH mode may be used with autothrottles, or with manual throttle control. When the IAS/MACH display shows IAS, the elevator command holds the speed that shows on the IAS/MACH window. When the IAS/MACH display shows MACH, the elevator command holds the MACH that shows on the IAS/MACH window. Rotating the IAS/MACH selector sets the speed in the IAS/MACH window. Pushing the IAS/MACH Reference switch alternately changes the IAS/MACH window between IAS and MACH. The Thrust Management Computing Function (TMCF) supplies the engine thrust commands.
  4. Altitude Hold
    Pushing the Altitude Hold (ALT) switch selects the Altitude hold mode. In this mode, the aircraft holds the barometric altitude present when the pilot pushes the altitude HOLD switch. Altitude Capture and Hold can also be engaged from a climb or descent as the aircraft approaches the altitude that is selected and displayed in the altitude window.
4. Landing Modes
  The following AFDS functions are available for landing:
  1. Localizer
    The Localizer (LOC) mode captures and holds the aircraft to a localizer flight path.
  2. Glideslope
    The Glideslope (G/S) mode captures and holds the aircraft to a vertical descent flight path.
  3. Flare
    The flare (FLARE) mode controls the aircraft to a smooth touchdown at a point past the glideslope antenna. This is a computed command and is not part of the glideslope mode.
  4. Runway Alignment
    In crosswind conditions, the runway alignment mode supplies roll and yaw control to decrease the aircraft crab angle for touchdown. The runway alignment mode also includes roll and yaw control for an engine failure in approach during autoland.
  5. Rollout
    After touchdown, the rollout (ROLLOUT) mode controls the aircraft to the runway centre line. Aircraft deviation from the localizer centre line supplies rudder and nose wheel steering signals.
  6. Go-Around
    The go-around (TO/GA) mode controls roll and pitch after an aborted approach. Also, the TMCF controls thrust during go- around.
    
    Pushing the LOC switch arms or disarms the localizer as roll mode. Pushing the Approach (APP) switch arms or disarms the localizer as roll mode and G/S as pitch mode (Figure 1.6F [below]).
    
    Localizer (LOC) Switch
    
    Approach (APP) Switch
    
    Copyright © Boeing. Reprinted with permission of The Boeing Company
    
    Figure 1.6F - Approach Mode Switches
5. Autothrottle (Thrust Management Computing Function)
  The autothrottle (A/T) commands the thrust levers to achieve an engine thrust setting, or a selected airspeed. The A/T is armed by raising one or both A/T Arm switches, and is engaged by a pushbutton switch on the MCP (Figure [below]). 1.6G
  
  During normal flight operations, the flight crew uses the Thrust Management Computing Function (TMCF) to perform several routine or normal operations and tasks. These operations or tasks relate to autothrottle modes. The A/T modes operate in these flight phases:
  
  Autothrottle (A/T) ARM Switches
  
  Autothrottle (A/T) Switch
  
  Copyright © Boeing. Reprinted with permission of The Boeing Company
  
  Figure 1.6G - Autothrottle Switches
  - Take-off (TO)
  - Climb (CLB)
  - Cruise (CRZ)
  - Descent (DES)
  - Approach (APP)
  - Go-around (GA)
    Autothrottle thrust mode annunciations relate to pitch mode annunciations on the Primary Flight Display (PFD).
6. Autothrottle Modes
  1. Take-off
    In take-off (TO), the autothrottle controls thrust to the TO thrust limit. The autothrottle mode annunciation on the PFD is thrust reference (THR REF). At a threshold air speed, the autothrottle mode annunciation on the PFD changes to HOLD.
  2. Climb
    These are the three autothrottle mode selections in climb (CLB):
    - Vertical navigation (VNAV)
    - Flight level change (FLCH) 65
      Autothrottle (MCP) speed mode or thrust mode. •
      
      These are the autothrottle mode annunciations for these modes:
    - THR REF when VNAV engages
    - THR when FLCH engages
    - SPD or THR REF when autothrottle mode engages.
      The autothrottle speed mode only engages when VNAV, FLCH, and TO/GA are not active, and the aircraft is in the air.
  3. Cruise
    In cruise, the pitch mode could be VNAV PTH, VNAV ALT or MCP ALT; the corresponding A/T mode is SPD.
  4. Descent
    These are the three autothrottle modes in descent (DES):
    
    VNAV • • FLCH • Autothrottle speed mode
    
    These are the autothrottle mode annunciations in descent:
    - IDLE, THR, SPD or HOLD shows for VNAV
    - THR, or HOLD shows for FLCH
    - SPD shows for V/S, FPA or no AFDS mode
  5. Approach
    SPD is normal mode in approach with glideslope active or in a manual approach (APP).
    - Go-Around
      A go-around (GA) mode request causes the autothrottle mode to change to THR. A second GA request causes the autothrottle mode to change to THR REF. The TO/GA switch must be pushed to request GA.
      
      Flare Retard •
      
      Flare retard occurs when a specified altitude threshold has been achieved when in SPD mode, or during an Autoland approach with a command from the autopilot flight director system (AFDS). The autothrottle mode changes to IDLE during a flare retard.
  6. Autothrottle Disconnect
    The autothrottle disconnects when there is a manual autothrottle disconnect or when there is thrust reverser application. This occurs after initial touchdown during rollout. The autothrottle will disconnect automatically for certain system faults.
Electrical Power
The electrical system generates and distributes AC and DC power to other aircraft systems, and is comprised of: main AC power, backup power, DC power, standby power, and flight controls power. System operation is automatic. Electrical faults are automatically detected and isolated. The AC electrical system is the main source for aircraft electrical power. (below) shows the cockpit electrical Figure 1.6H panel where electrical switching can be made. It also shows the associated lights.

As the various aircraft systems rely on electrical power, failure of the electrical buses will affect the systems operation which will in turn trigger the corresponding fault messages. These messages are collected by the CMCS which will transmit the messages, via the ACARS, to the Maintenance Control Centre (MCC).

Electrical Power Panel Switches/Lights 1. Battery Switch 11. Backup Generator OFF Lights 2. Battery OFF Light 12. Backup Generator (BACKUP GEN) Switches 3. APU Generator (APU GEN) 13. External Power AVAIL Lights Switch 4. APU Generator OFF Light 14. External Power ON Lights 5. BUS TIE Switches 15. External Power (EXT PWR) Switches 6. BUS Isolation (ISLN) Lights 16. CABIN/UTILITY Power OFF Light 7. Generator Control 17. Cabin/Utility (CABIN/UTILITY) (GEN CTRL) Switches Power Switch 8. Generator OFF Lights 18. IFE/PASS SEATS OFF Light 9. Drive Disconnect Switches 19. In Flight Entertainment System/ Passenger Seats (IFE/PASS 10. Generator DRIVE Lights SEATS) Power Switch Copyright © Boeing. Reprinted with permission of The Boeing Company Figure 1.6H - Electrical Power Panel Switches/Lights
1. Electrical Load Management System
  The Electrical Load Management System (ELMS) provides load management and protection to ensure power is available to critical and essential equipment. If the electrical loads exceed the power available (aircraft or external), ELMS automatically shed AC loads by priority until the loads are within the capacity of the aircraft or ground power generators. The load shedding is non-essential equipment first, then utility busses. Utility busses are followed by individual equipment items powered by the main AC busses. When an additional power source becomes available or the loads decrease, ELMS restores power to shed systems (in the reverse order). The message LOAD SHED displays on the electrical synoptic when load shed conditions exist.
2. Alternating Current Electrical System Power Sources
  The entire aircraft alternating current (AC) electrical load can be supplied by any two main AC power sources. The main AC electrical power sources are:
  - left and right engine integrated drive generators (IDGs) APU generator
  - primary and secondary external power
    The power sources normally operate isolated from one another. During power source transfers on the ground (such as switching from the APU generator to an engine generator) operating sources are momentarily paralleled to prevent power interruption.
3. Integrated Drive Generators
  Each engine has an Integrated Drive Generator (IDG). Each IDG has automatic control and system protection functions. When an engine starts, with the GENERATOR CONTROL switch selected ON, the IDG automatically powers the respective main bus. The previous power source is disconnected from that bus.
  
  The IDG can be electrically disconnected from the busses by pushing the GENERATOR CONTROL switch to OFF. The IDG can also be electrically disconnected from its respective bus by selecting an available external power source prior to engine 69
  
  shutdown. The DRIVE light illuminates and the EICAS message ELEC GEN DRIVE L or R displays when low oil pressure is detected in an IDG. The IDG drive can be disconnected from the engine by pushing the respective DRIVE DISCONNECT switch. The IDG cannot be reconnected by the flight crew. High drive temperature causes the IDG to disconnect automatically.
4. Auxiliary Power Unit Generator
  The Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) generator is electrically identical to the IDG generators. The APU generator can power either or both main busses and may be used in flight as a replacement to an IDG source. If no other power source is available when the APU generator becomes available, the APU generator automatically connects to both main AC busses. If the primary external source is powering both main busses, the APU powers the left main bus, and the primary external source continues to power the right main bus. If the primary external source is powering the right main bus, and the secondary external source is powering the left main bus, the APU then powers the left main bus and the primary external source continues to power the right main bus. If the secondary external source is powering both main busses, the APU then powers both main busses.
  
  The APU generator OFF light illuminates when the APU is operating and the APU generator breaker is open because of a fault or the APU GENERATOR switch is selected OFF. When the APU GENERATOR switch is ON and a fault is detected, the APU generator cannot connect to the busses.
  
  In flight, when both transfer busses are unpowered, the APU starts automatically, regardless of APU selector position.
5. Alternating Current Electrical Power Distribution
  The AC power is distributed through the left and right main busses and the ground service bus. The right IDG normally powers the right main bus and the left IDG normally powers the left main bus. The APU normally powers both main busses when they are not powered by any other source.
  
  Bus tie relays, controlled by BUS TIE switches, isolate or parallel the right and left main busses. When both BUS TIE switches are
  
  set to AUTO, the bus tie system operates automatically to maintain power to both main busses.
  
  Power transfers are made without interruption when the aircraft is on the ground, except when switching between primary and secondary external power sources. The source order for powering left and right main busses in flight is the:
  - respective IDG
  - APU generator
  - opposite IDG
6. Autoland
  During autoland, the busses isolate to allow three independent sources to power the three autopilots:
  - the left IDG powers the left AC transfer bus, the left main DC bus, and the captain’s flight instrument bus;
  - the right IDG powers the battery bus and AC standby bus through the main battery charger; and
  - the back-up system powers the right AC transfer bus, the right DC bus, and the first officer’s flight instrument bus.
7. Backup Alternating Current Electrical System
  The electrical system is highly reconfigurable to accommodate multiple failures. The electrical system is designed to automatically provide power to selected aircraft systems. The electrical system automatically powers one or both transfer busses when:
  - only one main AC generator (includes APU) is available;
  - power to one or both of the main AC busses is lost;
  - approach (APP) mode is selected for autoland; and
  - the system is automatically tested after engine starts
    The system automatically transfers power without interruption.
8. Backup Generators
  Backup power is provided by one variable speed, variable frequency generator mounted on each engine. A frequency
  
  converter converts the generator frequency to a constant 400 Hz. Only one backup generator can power the converter at a time.
  
  Each backup generator contains two permanent magnet generators (PMGs) that supply power to the flight control DC electrical system (refer to DC Electrical System). If both IDGs and the APU generator are inoperative, a backup generator powers essential aircraft equipment. To reduce electrical loading on the backup generator, the following systems are inoperative:
  - TCAS
  - SATCOM
  - Right HF radio
9. Direct Current Electrical System
  The direct current (DC) electrical system includes the main DC electrical system and the flight control DC electrical system. The main DC electrical system uses four transformer-rectifier units (TRUs) to produce DC power. The TRUs are powered by the AC transfer busses.
  
  TRU DC electrical power is distributed to various DC busses as follows:
  
  (1) The left TRU powers the left main DC bus, which provides a second DC power source for:
  - left flight control power supply assembly (PSA)
  - right main DC bus.
    (2) The right TRU powers the right main DC bus, which provides a second DC power source for:
  - right flight control PSA left main DC bus.
    (3) The C1 TRU powers the captain’s flight instrument bus and the battery bus. The captain’s flight instrument bus provides a second DC power source for:
  - centre flight control PSA first officer’s flight instrument bus
  - 72
    The C2 TRU powers the first officer’s flight instrument bus, which provides a second DC power source for the captain’s instrument bus.
10. Batteries
  The main battery is connected directly to the hot battery bus and provides standby power to other busses. The main battery charger normally powers the hot battery bus and maintains the main battery fully charged.
  
  The APU battery is connected directly to the APU battery bus and provides dedicated power to the APU electric starter, which is used when sufficient bleed air duct pressure is unavailable for the APU air turbine starter. The APU battery charger normally powers the APU battery bus and maintains the APU battery fully charged.
11. Flight Control Direct Current Electrical System
  The flight control DC electrical system is a dedicated power source for the primary flight control system. Primary power for the flight control DC electrical system comes from permanent magnet generators (PMGs) housed within each backup generator. Variable frequency PMG AC power is used by individual power supply assemblies (PSAs) to provide DC power to the three flight control DC busses. To ensure a high level of system reliability, each PSA also has multiple DC power sources. If primary PMG AC power is not available, secondary power for the left and right PSAs is provided by the related main DC bus. Secondary power for the centre PSA is provided by the captain’s flight instrument bus. The hot battery bus provides additional backup power for the left and centre PSAs only. Each PSA also uses a dedicated battery to prevent power interruptions to the related flight control DC bus. The batteries have limited capacity and are incorporated to supply power for brief periods during PSA power source transfers.
12. Standby Electrical System
  The standby electrical system can supply AC and DC power to selected flight instruments, communications and navigation systems, and the flight control system, if there are primary
  
  electrical power system failures. The standby electrical system consists of:
  - the main battery
  - the standby inverter the RAT generator and its associated generator control
  - unit
  - the C1 and C2 TRUs
    (1) Main Battery
    
    The main battery provides standby power to the:
    
    hot battery bus • • battery bus • captain’s flight instrument bus left and centre flight control PSAs • • standby inverter.
    
    Note:
    
    The main battery can power the standby system for a minimum of 10 minutes.
    
    (2) Standby Inverter
    
    The standby inverter converts DC power to AC power. The inverter powers the AC standby bus if the left transfer bus is not powered.
    
    (3) Ram Air Turbine Generator
    
    The ram air turbine (RAT) generator provides standby power to the C1 and C2 TRUs. The RAT can supply electrical and hydraulic power simultaneously. If the RAT is unable to maintain RPM, the RAT generator electrical load is shed until RPM is satisfactory. Power for standby electrical loads is provided by the main battery during deployment of the RAT and when RAT generator loads are shed. The RAT is deployed automatically if both AC transfer busses lose power in flight. The RAT can be manually deployed by using the RAM AIR TURBINE switch on the overhead panel.
    
    (4) Cabin Systems and Utility Power
    
    Electrical power to some cabin and utility systems are controlled from the cockpit. The IFE/PASS SEATS Power switch controls power to the IFE and passenger seats. The CABIN/UTILITY Power switch controls power to cabin and utility systems.
Cabin and Cargo Compartments
The aircraft, 9M-MRO was configured to 35 business class and 247 economy class seats. The business class and economy class seats were procured from BE Aerospace. An approved Lay Out of Passenger Accommodation (LOPA) determines the cabin interior configuration. Safety and emergency equipment are fitted and positioned throughout the cabin.

There is one crew rest area in the forward cabin behind the cockpit. There is a cabin crew rest area in the aft cabin lower lobe. Access is through a compartment door adjacent to Door 3R.

The cockpit door provides selective entry to the cockpit and is resistant to ballistic penetration. When closed, the door locks when electrical power is available and unlocks when electrical power is removed. A viewing lens in the door allows observation of the cabin. The door can be manually opened from the cockpit by turning the door handle.

An emergency access code is used to gain access to the cockpit in case of pilot incapacitation. Access is provided by the use of a Keypad Access System which consists of a numeric keypad outside the cockpit area and a chime module and electric strike that is not accessible from outside the cockpit. The chime module provides an audible alert to the pilots that the correct code has been entered into the keypad. There is also an indicator light in the cockpit and a Light Emitting Diode (LED) on the keypad that indicates that the correct code has been entered.

The pilots have a 3-position switch by which they can open the door lock, close the door lock, or permanently lock the door for a specified amount of time to prevent access by anyone regardless if the correct code is entered into the keypad.

The door has blowout panels that will open in the event of a rapid decompression of the passenger compartment. A pressure sensor controls an electric strike and allows the door to open inward in the event of a rapid decompression in the cockpit. These features serve to equalise the pressure between the passenger compartment and the cockpit in case of decompression either side of the door.

The aircraft is also fitted with a Flight Deck Entry Video Surveillance System (FDEVSS) which provides the pilots surveillance capability of the cockpit doorway and the forward galley areas. This allows the pilots to see the person who wants to access the cockpit before they allow entry.

There are four Type A passenger and service doors on each side of the aircraft. Each door has a window. The passenger compartment has windows along both sides of the passenger compartment. Each exit is fitted with a slide raft system for emergency use.

The overhead passenger cabin is fitted with Passenger Service Units (PSU) above each seat row. They are hinged and secured by a magnetic latch that is electrically controlled. In the event of cabin depressurisation, the PSU magnetic latch will be electrically released and allow the oxygen masks to drop for passenger use.

The aircraft cabin lighting system comprises of ceiling lights, sidewall lights, entry lights and emergency lights. The cabin management system (CMS) controls the passenger cabin lighting.

The lower section of the fuselage houses forward, aft and bulk cargo compartments. A cargo handling system is fitted for the forward and aft cargo to command power drive units (PDU) to move cargo containers laterally and longitudinally.

Cargo compartment sidewalls, ceilings and walkways are constructed of fire resistant materials. There is a smoke detection warning system and fire extinguishing system installed to contain any smoke or fire eventualities.
Flight Controls
The flight control system is an electronic fly by wire system. It is divided into two separate systems to control the aircraft in flight.

Primary Flight control system (PFCS) is a modern three axis, fly by wire system. It controls the roll, yaw and pitch commands using the ailerons, flaperons, spoilers, elevators, rudder and horizontal stabilizer. The high lift control system (HLCS) comprises of inboard and outboard trailing edge flaps, leading edge flaps and Kruger flaps. It supplies increased lift at lower speeds for take-off and landing.

6299 The PFCS and HLCS use 3 dedicated ARINC Flight Control digital busses to transmit data signals to command the flight controls. Mechanical control is available to two spoilers and horizontal stabilizers.

The PFCS has three operational modes of command - Normal mode, Secondary mode and Direct mode. The PFCS command signals are computed by three redundant Primary Flight Computers (PFCs) in Normal and Secondary modes and directed through four Actuator Control Electronic (ACE) units. In Direct mode, the control surface command signals are computed by the ACEs without reliance on the PFCs.

The PFC also receives airspeed, altitude and inertial reference data from Airplane Information Management System (AIMS), Air Data Inertial Reference Unit (ADIRU) and Secondary Attitude and Air Data Reference unit (SAARU). The PFCs calculate the flight control commands based on control laws, augmentation and envelop protections. The digital command signals from the PFCs go to the ACEs that will change the digital signal to analogue format and send to the power control units (PCU) that will command the control surface movement.

The HLCS operates in three modes, primary, secondary and alternate. Command signals are transmitted from the flap lever to two Flap Slat Electronic Units (FSEU).

The FSEU process the flap command and control the sequence of flaps and slats operation. It also commands auto slat, load relief and asymmetry protection.

Two spoilers and the horizontal stabilizer receive mechanical control signals from pilots input.

9 Aeronautical Radio, Incorporated (ARINC) 629 is an aeronautical standard which specifies multi- transmitter data bus protocol where up to 128 units can share the same bus. 77
Fuel System
The fuel system has three fuel tanks, two integral wing tanks and one centre tank. The tanks are part of the wing structure and have many fuel system components located inside the tanks and on the rear spar. The fuel tanks are vented through channels in the wing to allow near ambient pressure during all phases of flight.

An integrated refuel panel (IRP) on the lower left wing and two refuel receptacles on each wing allows rapid pressure refueling of the aircraft. The refueling operation is automatic with fuel load selection on the IRP. Fuel quantity indicating system (FQIS) processor unit controls all fueling operations and measuring of fuel quantity.

Several enhanced features were incorporated in the design to include the following:
- Ultrasonic Fuel Quantity Indicating system
- Automatic centre tank scavenge system
- Ultrasonic water detection system
- Densitometers Jettison system
  Fuel quantity is displayed on the fuel synoptic page and the upper EICAS fuel block.
1. Engine Fuel Feed System
  There are two boost pumps for each main tank and two override/ jettison pumps in the center tank to supply fuel to the engines. The fuel flows through the crossfeed manifold to the engines. Redundant crossfeed valves isolate the left and right sides of the manifold.
  
  At the start of a flight, when all the tanks are full, the normal procedure is to turn on all the fuel pumps. The override/jettison pumps supply center tank fuel to both engines. This occurs because the override/jettison pumps have a higher output pressure than the main tank boost pumps. When the override/jettison pump output pressure decreases because of low fuel quantity in the center tank, the boost pumps automatically supply fuel to both engines from the main tanks.
2. Auxiliary Power Unit Fuel Feed System
  The Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) can receive fuel from any tank. A DC pump supplies fuel from the left main tank if no AC power is available. APU fuel is supplied from the left fuel manifold. APU fuel can be provided by any AC fuel pump supplying fuel to the left fuel manifold or by the left main tank DC fuel pump. On the ground, with the APU switch ON and no AC power available, the DC pump runs automatically. With AC power available, the left forward AC fuel pump operates automatically, regardless of fuel pump switch position, and the DC fuel pump turns off. In flight, the DC fuel pump operates automatically for quick left engine relight with the loss of both engines and all AC power. Figure (below) shows the Engine and APU Fuel Feed System. 1.6I
  
  APU FUEL INLET
  
  ENGINE FUEL INLETS
  
  Copyright © Boeing. Reprinted with permission of The Boeing Company
  
  Figure 1.6I - Engine and APU Fuel Feed
3. Fuel Inlets
  The fuel intake inlet for the APU (in the left main tank) is located lower than that for the engine. As the fuel level drops below the engine fuel intake level the engine will be starved of fuel, however fuel will still be available for the APU as its fuel intake is lower. This difference in level between the engine and APU
  
  fuel intakes, accounts for approximately 30 pounds of fuel in a standard flight attitude (1° pitch). The APU is estimated to consume (when electrically loaded) approximately 2 pounds of fuel in 55 seconds which will amount to a maximum APU run time of 13 minutes and 45 seconds. The pitch attitude and in- flight accelerations can affect the actual amount available for the APU.
Hydraulics
There are three independent hydraulic systems using electrical, pneumatics or engine driven power source. They are identified as Left, Centre and Right. Each hydraulic system can independently operate the flight controls for safe flight and landing.

Each hydraulic system uses a Hydraulic Interface Module Electronics Card (HYDIM) for automatic control and indications. The three systems operate independently at 3000 psi nominal pressure.

The left system is powered by an engine driven pump (EDP) and an electric motor pump (ACMP). The right system is also powered by an EDP and ACMP. The centre system has two ACMP and two air driven pumps (ADP) and a ram air turbine (RAT) pump.

Hydraulic pumps control and indication are on the P5 overhead panel. During normal operation the flight crew will select the switches to the auto position before flight. The pressure and quantity indication is provided on the hydraulic synoptic page and the status page.

The primary pumps are the EDPs in the left and right system and the ACMPs for the centre system. These pumps operate continuously. The demand pumps are the ACMPs for the left and right systems and the ADPs for the centre system. These pumps normally operate only during heavy system demands. The operation logic is controlled and monitored by the HYDIM cards.

The RAT deploys automatically during flight when both engines are shutdown or for loss of all three hydraulic power. The RAT hydraulic pump supplies hydraulic power to some of the center hydraulic system flight controls. When the aircraft is operating on RAT power only, the flap drive hydraulic motor is isolated from the center hydraulic system and as a result the flaps will not respond to the cockpit flap handle inputs.
Instrumentation
The flight instruments and displays supply information to the flight crew on six flat panel liquid crystal display units:
- Captain and First Officer Primary Flight Display (PFD)
- Captain and First Officer Navigation Display (ND) Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System (EICAS)
- the Multifunction Display (MFD)
  Standby Flight Instruments provide information on separate indicators. Clocks display Airplane Information Management System (AIMS) generated UTC time and date, or manually set time and date.
1. Primary Flight Display
  The Primary Flight Display (PFD) presents a dynamic color display of all the parameters necessary for flight path control. The PFDs provide the following information:
  - flight mode annunciation airspeed
  - altitude
  - vertical speed attitude
  - steering information
  - radio altitude instrument landing system display
  - approach minimums
  - heading/track indications, engine fail, Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS), and Predictive Windshear (PWS) alerts.
    Failure flags are displayed for aircraft system failures. Displayed information is removed or replaced by dashes if no valid information is available to the display system (because of out-of- range or malfunctioning navigation aids). Displays are removed when a source fails or when no system source information is available.
2. Navigation Display
  The navigation displays (ND) provide a mode-selectable color flight progress display. The modes are: 81
  
  MAP • • VOR • APP (approach) PLN (plan) •
  
  The MAP, VOR, and APP modes can be switched between an expanded mode with a partial compass rose and a centered mode with a full compass rose.
3. Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System
  The Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) consolidates engine and aircraft system indications and is the primary means of displaying system indications and alerts to the flight crew. The most important indications are displayed on EICAS which is normally displayed on the upper centre display.
4. System Alert Level Definitions
  (1) Time Critical Warnings
  
  Time critical warnings alert the crew of a non-normal operational condition requiring immediate crew awareness and corrective action to maintain safe flight. Master warning lights, voice alerts, and ADI indications or stick shakers announce time critical conditions.
  
  (2) Warnings
  
  Warnings alert the crew to a non-normal operational or system condition requiring immediate crew awareness and corrective action.
  
  (3) Cautions
  
  Cautions alert the crew to a non-normal operational or system condition requiring immediate crew awareness. Corrective action may be required.
  
  (4) Advisories
  
  Advisories alert the crew to a non-normal operational or system condition requiring routine crew awareness. Corrective action may be required.
  
  (5) Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System Messages
  
  Systems conditions and configuration information are provided to the crew by four types of EICAS messages:
  - EICAS alert messages are the primary method to alert the crew to non-normal conditions.
  - EICAS communication messages direct the crew to normal communication conditions and messages.
  - EICAS memo messages are crew reminders of certain flight crew selected normal conditions.
  - EICAS status messages indicate equipment faults which may affect aircraft capability.
    An EICAS alert, communications, or memo message is no longer displayed when the respective condition no longer exists.
5. Multifunction Display
  The electronic checklist (ECL) system shows normal and non- normal checklists on a multifunction display (MFD). The electronic checklist system is not required for, and a paper checklist or other approved backup checklist must be available in the cockpit.
  
  The checklist display switch on the display select panel opens the electronic checklist. The flight crew operates the checklist with the cursor control devices (CCDs).
  
  The MFD has also communications functions which are used to control data link features. Data link messages not processed by the Flight Management Computer (FMC) are received, accepted, rejected, reviewed, composed, sent, and printed using communications functions on the MFD. ACARS and data link radio management functions are provided through communications management menus. The COMM display switch, located on the display select panel, displays the communications main menu on the selected MFD. 83
  
  Communications functions are selected using the cursor control device. Message text entry is accomplished by entering data into the Control Display Unit (CDU) scratchpad and transferring it to the appropriate area. Messages can be printed on the cockpit printer. Incoming message traffic is annunciated by EICAS communications messages.
6. Standby Flight Instruments
  The standby flight instruments include:
  - standby attitude indicator
  - standby airspeed indicator
  - standby altimeter
  - standby magnetic compass
    An external Power Supply Assembly supplies power to the standby attitude and airspeed indicators and the standby altimeter. The standby magnetic compass does not require any electrical power except for its lighting.
    
    (1) Standby Attitude Indicator
    
    The Standby Attitude Indicator displays Secondary Attitude Air Data Reference Unit (SAARU) attitude. A bank indicator and pitch scale are provided.
    
    (2) Standby Airspeed Indicator
    
    The Standby Airspeed Indicator displays airspeed calculated from two standby air data modules (one pitot and one static). It provides current airspeed in knots as a digital readout box with an airspeed pointer.
    
    (3) Standby Altimeter
    
    The standby altimeter displays altitude from the standby (static) air data module. Current altitude is displayed digitally. A pointer indicates altitude in hundreds of feet. The pointer makes one complete revolution at appropriate intervals.
    
    (4) Standby Magnetic Compass
    
    A standard liquid–damped magnetic standby compass is provided. A card located near the compass provides heading correction factors.
7. Clock
  A clock is located on each forward panel. Each clock displays Airplane Information Management System (AIMS) generated UTC time and date, or manually set time and date. The AIMS UTC time comes from the global positioning system (GPS). In addition to time, the clocks also provide alternating day-month and year, elapsed time, and chronograph functions.
Airplane Information Management System
The Airplane Information Management System (AIMS) collects and calculates large quantities of data. The AIMS manages this data for several integrated avionics systems. These systems are the:
- Primary display system (PDS)
- Central maintenance computing system (CMCS)
- Airplane condition monitoring system (ACMS)
- Flight data recorder system (FDRS)
- Data communication management system (DCMS) - including ACARS datalink
- Flight management computing system (FMCS)
- Thrust management computing system (TMCS)
  The AIMS has software functions that do the calculation for each of these avionics systems. The AIMS supplies one other software function that many aircraft systems use. It is the data conversion gateway function (DCGF).
  
  The AIMS has two cabinets, for redundancy, which do the calculations for other avionic systems. The Left cabinet is located in the forward rack of the Main Equipment Centre (MEC) while the Right cabinet is located in rear rack of the MEC. To do these calculations, each AIMS cabinet has the following:
- A cabinet chassis
- Four Input/output modules (IOM)
  Four Core processor modules (CPM) •
  
  The IOMs and CPMs are considered Line Replaceable Modules (LRM). The IOM transfers data between the software functions in the AIMS CPMs and external signal sources. The CPMs supply the software and hardware to do the calculations for several avionic systems. The software is called functions. To keep a necessary separation between the functions, each function is partitioned. The partitions permit multiple functions to use the same hardware and be in the same CPM.
  
  The Left AIMS cabinet gets electrical power from the 28V DC Capt Flight Instrument bus and the 28V DC F/O Flight Instrument bus. The Right AIMS cabinet gets electrical power from the 28V DC Left bus and the 28V DC Right bus. Each cabinet receives the power from four 28V DC circuit breakers in the overhead circuit breaker panel. The four 28V DC bus inputs are known as power 1 through power 4. Power 1 and power 2 enter the cabinet through a connector on the left side of the cabinet and therefore they are considered as left power. Power 3 and power 4 enter the cabinet through a connector on the right side of the cabinet and are considered as right power.
  
  Each LRM receives power from four sources, two for main power and two for monitor power. The main circuitry uses the main power. Special circuits that monitor the condition of the power supply in the LRM use the monitor power. The two main and two monitor sources of power for each LRM come from different power sources.
  
  Each AIMS cabinet also receives power through one hot battery bus circuit breaker in the standby power management panel. The connection to the hot battery bus keeps the LRMs internal memories active. The hot battery bus also makes the AIMS cabinet less likely to have faults due to power transients.
Navigation Systems
The Navigation systems of interest include Global Positioning System (GPS), Air Data Inertial Reference System (ADIRS) and the Flight Management System (FMS).
1. Global Positioning System
  The Left and right GPS receivers are independent and use navigation satellites to supply very accurate position data to the 86
  
  FMC. One is powered by the 115V AC Standby bus and the other by the 115V AC Transfer bus. They pass data to aircraft systems including the ADIRS via the AIMS. GPS tuning is automatic. If the Air Data Inertial Reference Unit (ADIRU) becomes inoperative during flight, the EICAS displays the message NAV ADIRU INERTIAL and the FMC uses only GPS data to navigate.
2. Inertial System
  The ADIRS calculates aircraft altitude, airspeed, attitude, heading, and position data for the displays, flight management system, flight controls, engine controls, and other systems. The major components of ADIRS are the ADIRU, Secondary Attitude and Air Data Reference Unit (SAARU), and air data modules. The ADIRU supplies primary flight data, inertial reference, and air data. The ADIRU is fault-tolerant and fully redundant. The SAARU is a secondary source of critical flight data for displays, flight control systems, and other systems. If the ADIRU fails, the SAARU automatically supplies attitude, heading, and air data. SAARU heading must be manually set to the standby compass magnetic heading periodically. The ADIRU and SAARU receive air data from the same three sources. The ADIRU and SAARU validate the air data before it may be used for navigation. The three air data sources are the left, centre, and right pitot and static systems.
3. Flight Management System
  The FMS aids the flight crew with navigation, in-flight performance optimisation, automatic fuel monitoring, and cockpit displays. Automatic flight functions manage the aircraft lateral flight path (LNAV) and vertical flight path (VNAV). The displays include a map for aircraft orientation and command markers on the airspeed, altitude, and thrust indicators to help in flying efficient profiles. The flight crew enters the applicable route and flight data into the CDUs. The FMS then uses the navigation database, aircraft position, and supporting system data to calculate commands for manual and automatic flight path control. The FMS tunes the navigation radios and sets courses. The FMS navigation database supplies the necessary data to fly routes, SIDs, STARs, holding patterns, and procedure turns. Cruise altitudes and crossing altitude restrictions are used to
  
  calculate VNAV commands. Lateral offsets from the programmed route can be calculated and commanded.
  
  The basis of the flight management system is the flight management computer function. Under normal conditions, one Flight Management Computer (FMC) accomplishes the flight management tasks while the other FMC monitors. The second FMC is ready to replace the first FMC if system faults occur. The FMC uses flight crew-entered flight plan data, aircraft systems data, and data from the FMC navigation database to calculate aircraft present position and pitch, roll, and thrust commands necessary to fly an optimum flight profile. The FMC sends these commands to the autothrottle, autopilot, and flight director. Map and route data are sent to the NDs. The EFIS control panels select the necessary data for the ND. The mode control panel selects the autothrottle, autopilot, and flight director operating modes.
  
  Crew Procedure on the operations and programming of the Flight Management System safeguards and protects against incorrect execution of erroneous Information for the Navigation and Performance Data Input. Different levels of verification and cross checking between the Captain and Co-Pilot ensure that any error would be captured and corrected during the crew preparation.
  
  In addition, system logics will also prevent the crew against selection of the wrong co-ordinates from the stored Navigation Database if a particular waypoint code happens to be used by many different places worldwide.
Oxygen Systems
1. Flight Crew Oxygen System
  The flight crew oxygen system provides oxygen to the flight crew for emergencies and other procedures which make its use necessary. The oxygen is supplied by two cylinders located in the left side of the main equipment centre. Each cylinder is made of composite material and holds 115 cubic feet (3,256 litres) of oxygen at 1,850 psi. The oxygen is supplied, through regulators, to four oxygen masks in the cockpit, one each for the Captain, the First Officer, the First Observer and the Second Observer. The mask has a dilution control which is normally set at ‘Normal’ position. In this position the oxygen is diluted with 88

ambient air according to the pressure altitude in the cockpit. It can also be selected to ‘100%’, in which case 100% oxygen will be supplied. (below) shows the expected duration Table 1.6E of oxygen supply from the two cylinders with the dilution control in ‘Normal’ position.

Table 1.6E – Expected Duration of Oxygen Supply for Flight Crew

Table 1.6E – Expected Duration of Oxygen Supply for Flight Crew at Aircraft Altitude 36,000 ft
AIRCRAFT ALTITUDE: 36,000 ft
Cabin Altitude: 8,000 ft.		Cabin Altitude: 36,000 ft.
No. of Crew Members	Expected Duration (hour)	No. of Crew Members	Expected Duration (hour)
1	42	1	27
2	21	2	13
3	14	3	9
4	10.5	4	6.5

AIRCRAFT ALTITUDE: 36,000 ft Cabin Altitude: 8,000 ft. Cabin Altitude: 36,000 ft. No. of Expected No. of Expected Crew Duration Crew Duration Members (hour) Members (hour) 1 42 1 27 2 21 2 13 3 14 3 9 4 10.5 4 6.5 Table 1.6E - Expected Duration of Crew Oxygen

Aircraft altitude is assumed to be 36,000 ft. A cabin altitude of 8,000 ft. would indicate a normally pressurised cabin and a cabin altitude of 36,000 ft. would indicate an unpressurised cabin. At this cabin altitude of 36,000 ft, 100% oxygen will be supplied even with the dilution control in the ‘Normal’ position.

Passenger Oxygen System
The passenger oxygen system is supplied by separate and individual chemical oxygen generators. The oxygen system provides oxygen to:
- passenger seats
- attendant stations
- lower crew rest compartment
- lavatory service units
  The passenger oxygen masks and chemical oxygen generators are located in passenger service units (PSUs). A door with an electrically operated latch keeps the masks in a box until the oxygen deployment circuit operates. The deployment circuit operates, and the masks automatically drop from the PSUs if cabin altitude exceeds approximately 13,500 feet. The passenger masks can be manually deployed from the cockpit by pushing the overhead panel PASSENGER OXYGEN switch to the ON position. Oxygen flows from a PSU generator
  
  when any mask hanging from that PSU is pulled. Oxygen is available for approximately 22 minutes. The electrical power to the latch is supplied through a circuit breaker located in the Main Equipment Centre. It is not possible to deactivate automatic deployment of the masks from the cockpit.
Portable Oxygen
Portable oxygen cylinder lets the flight attendants move in the aircraft when oxygen is in use. It is also a gaseous oxygen supply for medical emergencies. The bottle is fitted with disposable mask. 15 cylinders are located throughout the passenger cabin. Each cylinder is of 11 cubic ft (310 litres) capacity. The flow of oxygen can be controlled by an ‘Off-On’ knob which can be rotated to control the flow from 0 to 20 litres per minute. Therefore, the minimum time for the portable oxygen supply from full is 15.5 minutes.

Central Maintenance Computing System
The Central Maintenance Computing System (CMCS) collects and stores information from most of the aircraft systems. It can store fault histories as well as monitor and conduct tests on the various systems. The fault history contains details of warnings, cautions and maintenance messages.

At regular intervals, during flight, the CMCS transmits any recorded fault messages, via the Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS), to the Maintenance Control Centre (MCC) of Malaysia Airlines. This helps in the planning and preparation for the rectification of any potential aircraft defects at the main base or line stations. Refer also to 9). Section 1.6.4 para.
Engines
The aircraft is fitted with two engines (Model: RB211 TRENT 892B- 17) manufactured by Rolls-Royce. The RB211 TRENT 892B-17 engine is a high bypass turbofan (bypass ratio of 6.4:1 at a typical cruise thrust) axial flow, three-rotor with a single low pressure fan driven by a five-stage, low-pressure turbine.

The engine has an eight-stage intermediate pressure compressor driven by a single-stage turbine and a six-stage high pressure compressor driven by a single-stage turbine.

The engine take-off thrust is 92,800 lb and weighing approximately 15,700 lb (7,136 kg). The engines are certified in accordance with the US FAA Type Certificate E00050EN.

The FAA Type Certificate Data Sheet certifies that the engines meet the smoke and gaseous emission requirements of the US FAR 34. The engine is certified under FAR Part 36 Stage 3 Noise regulation.

The engine is fitted with a digital Electronic Engine Fuel Control System and it interfaces with many systems and components in the form of primary analogue or ARINC 629 buses.

The following analogue engine fuel and control system interfaces and correlates with the other systems for supply and feedback:
- Engine ignition - ignition unit power
- Engine air - actuator and valves
- Engine controls - resolver excitation and position
- Engine indicating - engine parameter data
- Engine exhaust - thrust reverser operations
- Engine oil - oil cooling and indications
- Engine starting - auto-start and manual start
- Electrical power - aircraft power from the Electrical Load Management System (ELMS)
  The following ARINC 629 engine fuel and control system interfaces and correlates with other systems for supply, control and indication data:
  
  AIMS - indication, air data and flight management control • • Cockpit controls - switch position and indication • Flap Slat Electronic Unit (FSEU) - Flap indication Proximity Switch Electronic Unit (PSEU) - Landing gear lever • position • Air Supply Cabin Pressure Controller (ASCPC) - Pneumatic system demand
  
  The RB211 TRENT 892B-17 engine Electronic Engine Control (EEC) serves as the primary component of the engine fuel control system and uses data from the engine sensors and aircraft systems 91
  
  to control the engine operations. The EEC controls most of the engine components and receives feedback from them. These digital data go to the Engine Data Interface Unit (EDIU) and send the signal to the AIMS. The AIMS transmits and receives a large amount of data to and from the EEC. These include:
- Engine bleed status - EEC thrust limit calculations Air data - EEC thrust limit calculations
- Engine data – system requirements
- Autothrottle Engine Pressure Ratio (EPR) trim - thrust balancing Condition monitoring - performance tracking
- Maintenance data - trouble shooting
- Primary display system data - indication.
Auxiliary Power Unit
The aircraft is fitted with an Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) - Model: GTCP 331-500 - manufactured by Allied Signal. The Allied Signal GTCP 331-500 gas turbine APU is a two-stage centrifugal flow compressor, a reverse flow annular combustion chamber and a three-stage axial flow turbine. It supplies the auxiliary power system for the aircraft pneumatic and electrical power. This permits independent operations from the ground external power sources or the main engines.

The APU generator supplies 120 KVA electrical power at any altitude. The APU can start at all altitudes up to the service ceiling of the aircraft (43,100 ft/13,100 m). Electrical power is available up to the service ceiling and pneumatic power is available up to 22,000 ft (6,700 m).

The ELMS contains the APU autostart logic and sends signal to the APU Controller (APUC).

The APU Controller serves to control the APU functions for:
- Starting and ignition
- Fuel metering
- Surge control
- Inlet guide vane (IGV) control
- Data storage
- Protective shutdown
- BITE/Fault reporting 92
  APU indication •
  
  The APU is designed to automatically start when certain logic conditions are met when the aircraft is in the air or electrical power removed from left and right transfer buses from respective No. 1 and No. 2 engine generators.
Communications
For Communications Systems description, refer to 1.9. Section

1.6.9 Aircraft Performance

The detailed Boeing Performance analysis of the aircraft is provided in This section summarises the aircraft performance and Appendix 1.6E. range capability of MH370.

The following data were available to help analyse the possible flight paths of the aircraft: ACARS data, radar data, and satellite data. Wind data were incorporated along the paths to determine the true airspeed which was incorporated into the performance fuel burn and range analysis.

The ACARS data provided the quantity of fuel on board after approximately 25 minutes of flight following take-off from KUL.

The radar data provided information about the flight path and ground speed after the last ACARS transmission and captured the left turn off of the scheduled route until the data ended over the Straits of Malacca. The analysis of the radar data allowed for an estimation of the fuel burn during that portion of the flight. However, that estimation was built on many assumptions, including flying at constant altitude and constant airspeed during each flight segment.

The satellite data provided evidence that the satellite was in communication with the aircraft until the last transmission at time 0019:29.42 UTC, approximately 7 hours and 37 minutes after take-off from KUL. Refer to 1.9.5. Section

The performance range capability of the aircraft, along with the satellite data, allowed for the creation of multiple flight path profiles that 7th Arc10. demonstrate that the aircraft had the range capability to reach the

10 - Lines created along the earth representing a set of possible aircraft positions at the time of satellite Arcs communication based on Burst Timing Offset (BTO). Refer to for further details. Appendix 1.6E 93

Many assumptions were also made during the flight path profile creation, including but not limited to, constant altitude and constant speed from Arc 1 to Arc 7, with the restriction that there were no course changes between the arcs. Additional analyses were conducted in Boeing and MAS simulators that continued the analysis after fuel exhaustion and assumed no intervention in the cockpit.

The results of the simulator session showed that the aircraft would roll gently to the left due to residual rudder deflection commanded by the Thrust Asymmetry Compensation (TAC) with the end of flight occurring within a 100 nm2 box that extended 10 nm beyond fuel exhaustion and 10 nm to the left of the flight path. The maximum range after dual engine flame-out would have been achieved through driftdown, with manual control keeping the aircraft in wings level flight, and would extend the range of the aircraft by approximately 120 nm beyond the location of the dual engine flame-out.

1.6.10 Boeing Patent on Remote Control Take-over of Aircraft

There have been speculations that MH370 could have been taken over control remotely in order to foil a hijack attempt. Some of these speculations have mentioned a US patent that Boeing filed for in February 2003 and received (US 7,142,971 B2) in November 2006 for a system that, once activated, would remove all controls from pilots and automatically fly and land the aircraft at a predetermined location.

According to the patent, existing preventative measures such as bullet- proof doors and the carriage of air marshals on board may have vulnerabilities. The flight crew could decide to open a lockable bullet-proof cockpit door [refer to 4)] and air marshals, if used, Section 1.6.8, para. might be over-powered. In light of the potential that unauthorised persons might be able to access the flight controls of an aircraft, the inventors conceived of a technique to avoid this risk by removing any form of human decision process that may be influenced by the circumstances of the situation, including threats or violence on-board.

The ‘uninterruptible’ autopilot envisioned by the patent could be activated, either by pilots, on-board sensors or remotely via radio or satellite links by the airline or government agencies if there were attempts to forcibly gain control of the cockpit. This system once activated would disallow pilot inputs and prevent anyone on-board from interrupting the automatic take- over. Thus, the personnel on-board could not be forced into carrying out the demands of any unauthorised person(s). To make it fully independent, 94

the system described in the patent would have its own power supply, inaccessible in-flight, so that it could not be disengaged by tripping circuit breakers accessible on-board the aircraft. The aircraft would remain in automatic mode until after landing when ground crew working in conjunction with authorised personnel would be called to disengage the system.

Boeing has confirmed that it has not implemented the patented system or any other technology to remotely pilot a commercial aircraft and is not aware of any Boeing commercial aircraft that has incorporated such technology. The technology was never installed on an aircraft.

It should also be noted that the aircraft 9M-MRO was delivered in May 2002 to MAS before the patent was issued in 2006. The aircraft was under the control of MAS for the entire time after delivery except for a short duration at Pudong, Shanghai Airport, China in August 2012, when it underwent wing tip repair by Boeing [refer to 2)]. Even then the Section 1.6.4, para. repair was under the oversight of MAS engineers. Aircraft modification installation data do not indicate that any systems like that described in the patent were installed on the aircraft post delivery and during in-service. Airworthiness protocols require that all modifications are approved for installation and a record kept of each modification incorporated. There is no reason to believe any systems like that described in the patent either were or could have been incorporated without the knowledge of MAS.

From the foregoing, there is no evidence to support the belief that control of the aircraft 9M-MRO (operating as MH370) could have been or was taken over remotely as the technology was not implemented on commercial aircraft.

1.7 METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

1.7.1 Meteorological Situation

Climatologically for the month of March, the position of the sub-tropical high is located over the Gulf of Thailand. The weather is generally dry with very little clouds. The winds are generally light from the surface to the height of 40,000 ft above sea level.

The infra-red image taken by the geostationary satellite Multifunctional Transport Satellites (MTSAT) 1R of Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) at 1732 UTC 07 March 2014 [0132 MYT 08 March 2014] [below]) (Figure 1.7A showed that there were no significant clouds at the last civil radar point at 1722 UTC, 07 March 2014 [0122 MYT, 08 March 2014].

Source: Malaysian Meteorological Department

Figure 1.7A - Infrared Satellite image taken by MTSAT at 1732 UTC 07 March 2014 [0132 MYT, 08 March2014]

The meteorological radar image taken at 1722 UTC, 07 March 2014 [0122 MYT, 08 March 2014] (Figure [below]) showed that no rain occurred 1.7B at the last civil radar point.

Source: Malaysian Meteorological Department

Figure 1.7B - Meteorological Radar Image at 1722 UTC 07 March 2014 [0122 MYT, 08 March 2014]

No lightning discharges were detected by the Lightning Detection System of the Malaysia Meteorological Department at the vicinity of last civil radar point from 1600 to 2159 UTC, 07 March 2014 [0000 to 0559 MYT, 08 March 2014]. (below) shows the lightning detected 1700 Figure 1.7C Blue symbol UTC to 1800 UTC, 07 March 2014 [0100 to 0200 MYT, 08 March 2014].

Source: Malaysian Meteorological Department

Figure 1.7C - Lightning Detection Map from 1600 to 2159 UTC 07 March 2014 [0000 to 0559, 08 March 2014]

The Meteorological Aerodrome Report (METAR) issued at 1600, 1700 and 1800 UTC [0000, 0100 and 0200 MYT, 08 March 2014] from Kota Bharu Sultan Ismail Petra Airport (WMKC), Kuala Terengganu Airport (WMKN), Penang International Airport (WMKP) and KLIA (WMKK) (Figure 1.7D [below]) did not report any significant weather phenomena.

Source: Malaysian Meteorological Department

Figure 1.7D - Locations of METAR Reports

There was no direct observation of the wind conditions at the last civil radar point, the closest upper air observation was at the Kota Bharu Meteorological Station, taken at 1200 UTC, 07 March 2014 and at 0000 UTC, 08 March 2014 [2000 MYT, 07 March 2014 and 0800 MYT, 08 March -40oC 2014] respectively, both reported a temperature of and wind from the north-east at 15 kt or less at 36,000 ft above sea level.

1.7.2 Comments on the Information Available

Forecast Charts
1. Significant Weather Chart
  The Significant Weather Chart (SIGWX) PGCE05 EGRR 061800 issued by World Area Forecast Centre (WAFC) London Fixed Time Prognostic Chart ICAO Area G SIGWX for FL250-630 (25,000 ft to 63,000 ft above standard sea-level pressure) valid 1800 UTC, 07 March 2014 [0200 MYT, 08 March 2014] showed that the filed flight plan route (red dotted line - Figure. 1.7E [below]) passed through a westerly jet stream with wind speed of up to 150 kt at latitude 30°N at FL390. Another westerly jet stream with wind speed of up to 100 kt at FL310 at the destination. Light clear air turbulence (CAT) might be expected from 25°N onwards 99
  
  to the destination. However, no significant adverse weather phenomenon was expected for the whole planned flight route.
  
  Source: WAFC London
  
  Figure 1.7E - Significant Weather Chart PGCE05 Issued by WAFC London Fixed Time ICAO Area G Prognostic Chart SIGWX FL250-630 valid 1800 UTC, 07 March 2014 [0200 MYT, 08 March 2014
2. Wind and Temperature Forecast Chart
  The wind and temperature forecast chart PWGE25 for FL340 valid 1800 UTC, 07 March 2014 issued by WAFC Washington showed the jet stream as in the significant weather chart above. The forecast winds at the last civil radar point and last air defence radar point were below 20 kt [below]). (Figure 1.7F
Significant Meteorological Information
Significant Meteorological Information (SIGMET) 3 was issued for the GUANGZHOU FIR valid from 12:45 to 16:45 UTC, 07 March 2014 [0200 MYT, 08 March 2014] indicated a thunderstorm forecast north of latitude 27°N and moving eastwards at 50 km/h in the layer with cloud tops at FL260.
Volcanic Ash Advisory
Volcanic ash advisories issued by Darwin Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre (VAAC) on 07 March 2014 at 06:27 and 18:37 UTC [2045 MYT, 07 March 2014 and 0045 MYT, 08 March 2014] for Sinabung (Sumatra, Indonesia) highlighted volcanic eruption located at 3.10°N 98.23°E (Figure [above]) and volcanic ash plume observed up to FL120 1.7E and the plume was extending toward the west.

Source: WAFC Washington

Figure 1.7F - The wind and temperature forecast chart PWGE25 issued by WAFC Washington 2014 [0200 MYT, 08 March 2014] for FL340 valid 1800 UTC 07 March

1.7.3 Availability of Meteorological Information

The necessary meteorological information was made available to the crew.

1.8 AIDS TO NAVIGATION

Not applicable.

1.9 COMMUNICATIONS

1.9.1 High Frequency System

This aircraft was installed with Collins HFS-900 High Frequency (HF) System. The HF communication system on this aircraft uses two HF systems with a common HF antenna to transmit and receive radio frequency (RF) signals in the HF range.

The HF transceiver operates within the frequency range of 2,000 MHz to 29,999 MHz and one KHz channel spacing.

The Left Transfer bus sends 115V AC three-phase power to the Left HF communication system. The Left HF communication transceiver supplies 115V AC single phase to the Left HF antenna coupler for operational power. It also supplies 28V DC for the key interlock function. The Right HF communication system is the same as the Left, except that it uses power from the Right AC Sec 2 bus.

1.9.2 Very High Frequency System

This aircraft was installed with Collins VHF-900B VHF System. The very high frequency (VHF) communication system permits voice and data communication over line-of-sight distances. It permits communication between aircraft or between ground stations and aircraft. The VHF system operates in the VHF aeronautical frequency range of 118.000 MHz to 136.992 MHz.

The VHF communication system on this aircraft uses three VHF systems. Each VHF system has a VHF antenna and a VHF communication transceiver.

The VHF communication system connects with Selective Calling Equipment (SELCAL) decoder that starts an alert when a call comes in for that aircraft.

The captain’s flight instrument bus sends 28V DC to the Left VHF communication transceiver and the Left Radio Tuning Panel (RTP). The Left Main DC bus sends 28V DC to the centre VHF communication transceiver and the centre RTP.

The Right Main DC bus sends 28V DC to the right VHF communication transceiver and the right RTP.

1.9.3 Air Traffic Control/Mode S Transponder System

This aircraft was installed with a Bendix/King TRA-67A Mode S transponder. The Air Traffic Control (ATC) ground stations interrogate the airborne ATC/Mode S transponder system as shown in (below). Figure 1.9A

The ATC/Mode S transponder replies to the interrogations in the form of coded information that the ground station uses. The ground station uses a Primary Surveillance Radar (PSR) to get radar returns from aircraft within the radar range. To make a communication link with the aircraft in the radar range, the ground station uses a Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) to interrogate the ATC/Mode S transponder. The ground station transmits a side lobe suppression signal to inhibit close ATC replies that come from a SSR side lobe transmission.

Figure 1.9A - Air Traffic Control/Mode S Transponder System

On the ground radar display, the Air Traffic Controller (ATC) sees the radar returns, altitude, and a four digit aircraft identifier. The ATC also sees aircraft derived Enhanced Surveillance downlink data on the ground station radar display, such as Magnetic Heading, Air Speed (Indicated Air Speed and Mach number), Ground Speed, Roll Angle, Selected Altitude, True Track Angle, and Vertical Rate.

The ATC/Mode S transponder also replies to mode S interrogations from the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS) of other aircraft. ATC/Mode S transponders with Extended Squitter function provide broadcast of Global Position System (GPS) position and velocity data.

Two transponders are installed on the aircraft. A Transponder selector switch on the Transponder panel in the cockpit allows selection of either the left or the right transponder. During normal operations the crew procedure is to leave the left transponder selected on the panel. There is no automatic switching between the transponders if one fails. It must be done manually by the pilots. Failure of either of the transponders will be annunciated in the cockpit. The Left ATC/Mode S transponder gets 115V AC power from the AC Standby bus. The Right ATC/Mode S transponder gets 115V AC power from the Right AC Transfer bus. The dual transponder panel gets 115V AC power from the AC Standby bus. The two transponders are powered by highly reconfigurable AC buses; the left one can be powered by the battery if the left AC bus is unavailable (the AC Standby bus can be powered by the left Transfer bus or the battery), and the AC Transfer busses also have their alternate sources.

This system can be deactivated (turned OFF) by pulling the circuit breakers located at the P11 overhead circuit breaker panel or by selecting the Transponder Mode Selector (Transponder Panel) to “STBY” position. The transponder on the occurrence flight was operating satisfactorily up to the time it was lost on the ATC radar screen at 1721.13 UTC, 07 March 2014 [0121:13 MYT, 08 March 2014]. There was no message received from the aircraft to report a system failure.

1.9.4 Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System

The Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) is a digital data-link system that manages flight plan and maintenance data between the aircraft and the Ground Service Provider (GSP) by using radio i.e. VHF or satellite communications (SATCOM) as shown in Figure 1.9B (below).

Figure 1.9B - ACARS System

ACARS provides message communication between aircraft and its base (ground). The following messages are transmitted:

Out of the gate, Off the ground, On the ground, and Into the gate
(OOOI) events:

Out of the gate event: Departure from the gate with all doors - closed and parking brake released;

Off the ground event: Take-off with the nose gear squat switch - extended;

On the ground event: Touch down with the nose gear squat switch - compressed; and

Into the gate event: Parked at the gate with the parking brake set - and the door open.
Flight plans: ACARS interfaces with Flight Management Systems (FMS) acting as the communication system for flight plans to be sent from the ground to the FMS. This enables the aircraft to update the FMS while in flight and allows the flight crew to evaluate the alternative flight plans including the status of connecting flights.
Weather information: ACARS interfaces with FMS, acting as the • communication system for weather information to be sent from the ground to the FMS. This enables the aircraft to update the FMS while in flight and allows the flight crew to evaluate new weather conditions.
Equipment health: ACARS is used to send information from the aircraft to ground stations about the conditions of various aircraft systems and sensors in real-time. Maintenance faults and abnormal events are also transmitted to ground stations along with detailed messages, which are used by MAS for monitoring equipment health, and to better plan the repair and maintenance activities.
Aircraft positions which provide latitude and longitude, altitude, speed, total air temperature, total remaining fuel, wind direction and speed and heading.
Engine performance data which provide engine data during take-off, climb, cruise and approach.
ACARS interfaces with the Multifunction Display (MFD) in the cockpit, which flight crew can use to send and receive technical messages and reports to or from ground stations, such as a request for weather information or clearances or the status of connecting flights. The response from the ground station is received on the aircraft via ACARS as well. The ACARS Manager page in the Communications main menu on the selected Multifunction Display (MFD) is used for this purpose. The COMM display switch, located on the display select panel, displays the communications main menu on the selected MFD. The ACARS Manager page allows the flight crew to independently select/deselect VHF or SATCOM transmission of data.

The ACARS communicates through either the VHF or the SATCOM systems. The ACARS datalink connects to the Satellite Data Unit (SDU) of the SATCOM system and the Center and Right VHF Communication Transceivers of the VHF systems. The Center VHF exchanges data with the ACARS modem in the Communications Core Processor Module (CPM/Comm) of the Left AIMS cabinet. The right VHF exchanges data with

the ACARS modem in the CPM/Comm of the Right AIMS cabinet. The ACARS does not interface with the Left VHF Transceiver.

For the ACARS operation the Data Communication Management Function (DCMF) of the AIMS uses the voice/data select to set the VHF Communication Transceiver to the data signal mode. At power-up, the DCMF sets the Center VHF Communication Transceiver to the data signal mode. If the Center VHF Communication Transceiver fails, or voice is selected manually by the flight crew, the DCMF selects SATCOM for data transmissions. If SATCOM fails, the DCMF selects the Right VHF Communication Transceiver for data transmissions. The Left VHF Communication Transceiver is voice only. On the event flight, as instructed by Ground Operations via text message shown on the MFD (shown as ‘Switch VHF3 to Voice’), the flight crew would have selected voice on the Center VHF resulting in SATCOM being used for the data transmissions. Refer to page 1 of Log. The use of SATCOM Appendix 1.9A – ACARS Traffic for the ACARS transmissions is evident in the SATCOM Ground Station Logs [refer to 1.9.5, 4)]. This switching from VHF to SATCOM for the Section para. data transmissions is normal practice in MAS for commercial reasons.

Table 1.9B – Summary of SATCOM Transmissions for MH370

Table 1.9B – Summary of SATCOM Transmissions for MH370
SATCOM TRANSMISSIONS		TIME
		UTC	MYT*
1.	Aircraft departed KLIA	1642	0042
2.	Last ACARS transmission	1707	0107
3.	1st handshake - log-on initiated by the aircraft	1825	0225
4.	Unanswered ground-to-air telephone call	1839	0239
5.	2nd handshake initiated by ground station	1941	0341
6.	3rd handshake initiated by ground station	2041	0441
7.	4th handshake initiated by ground station	2141	0541
8.	5th handshake initiated by ground station	2241	0641
9.	Unanswered ground-to-air telephone call	2313	0713
10.	6th handshake initiated by ground station	* 0011	0811
11.	7th handshake - log-on initiated by the aircraft	* 0019	0819
12.	Aircraft did not respond to ‘handshake’ from Satellite Earth Ground Station	* 0115	0915
* 08 March 2014

In the event that the aircraft ACARS unit has been silent for longer than a pre-set time interval, the ground station can ping the aircraft (directly or via satellite). A ping response indicates a healthy ACARS communication. This ping is different from the Satellite ping or handshake.

Pre-set time interval for MAS B777 is 30 minutes. When the aircraft ACARS is silent for more than 30 minutes, MAS Operation Control Centre (OCC) is required to send a text message via ACARS to the cockpit or to call the cockpit via SATCOM.

Aircraft Communications Addressing & Reporting System Traffic Log
ACARS traffic log messages sent/received to/from 9M-MRO between 1554:41 UTC, 07 March 2014 [2354:41 MYT, 07 March 2014] until 1815:25 UTC, 07 March 2014 [0215:25 MYT, 08 March 2014] is shown in 1.9A. Some key events are extracted Appendix and explained below.

At 1554:41 UTC, 07 March 2014, ACARS data link was fully established on SATCOM transmission and at 1556:08 UTC the flight information (FI) MH0370 and Aircraft Number (AN) 9M-MRO were keyed in by the crew as per (below). Figure 1.9C

Figure 1.9C - ACARS data link established SATCOM transmission

Notice to Crew (NOTOC) was sent at 1606:15 UTC on 07 March 2014 [0006:15 MYT, 08 March 2014] direct to the aircraft printer and to be printed out by the crew.

NOTOC from the ground station to the cockpit stated the special loads of total 4,566 kg of mangosteens were carried on board. Details of the mangosteens were:
- 1,128 kg at station 41L,
- 1,152 kg at station 41R, 1,148 kg at station 43L, and
- 1,138 kg at 44L respectively.
  (Refer to for details of cargo carried). Section 1.18.2
  
  Declaration of “there is no evidence that any damaged or leaking packages containing dangerous goods have been loaded on the was also written in the NOTOC message. aircraft at this station” (below) shows the snapshot of the ACARS NOTOC Figure 1.9D message.
  
  Aircraft final loadsheet was sent via ACARS at 1606:32 UTC, 07 March 2014 [0006:32 MYT, 08 March 2014] direct to the aircraft printer and to be printed out by the crew. Details of aircraft weight as stated in the final loadsheet are discussed in 1.6.5. Section
  
  Figure 1.9D - Snapshot of ACARS NOTOC message
  
  (below) shows the snapshot of the final loadsheet of this Figure 1.9E aircraft.
  
  Figure 1.9E - Final Loadsheet
  
  Pilot acknowledgement and confirmation of the final loadsheet is shown in the ACARS snapshot in (below). Figure 1.9F
  
  Figure 1.9F - Final Loadsheet Acknowledgement
  
  Data on aircraft APU is shown in (below). APU report Figure 1.9G generated by ACMS sent via ACARS at 1629:33 UTC stated the total APU cycles and hours were 15,699 cycles and 22,093 hours. APU hours for the previous flight was 4 hours.
  
  Figure 1.9G - APU Report
  
  Engine take-off and climb reports transmitted via ACARS are explained in 8). Engine parameter reports were Section 1.6.4 para. transmitted to MAS and then to Rolls Royce for Engine Health Monitoring (EHM). shows these data in coded form. Appendix 1.9A The decoded data are shown in 1.6B. Appendix
  
  The first (which was also the last) position report was transmitted via ACARS at 1707:29 UTC, 07 March 2014 [0107:29 MYT, 08 March 2014]. This was a collation of 6 reports generated at 5-minute intervals by the system at 1641:43 UTC, 1646:43 UTC, 1651:43 UTC, 1656:43 UTC, 1701:43 UTC and 1706:43 UTC, 07 March 2014. Parameters transmitted are as per (below). The actual Table 1.9A traffic log on the position report is reproduced in (below). Figure 1.9H Position reports were programmed to be transmitted every 30 minutes.
  
  Note:
  
  Aircraft position information is also included in the EHM take-off and climb reports.
  
  Greenwich Mean 1641:43 1646:43 1651:43 1656:43 1701:43 1706:43 Time (GMT) - UTC Altitude (ALT) – 103 10,582 21,193 28,938 34,998 35,004 Feet Calibrated 168.4 261.8 301.1 303.1 278.0 278.4 Airspeed (CAS) - Knots. MACH 0.255 0.478 0.669 0.783 0.819 0.821 Total Air 31.1 23.4 11.6 2.5 -13.4 -13.1 Temperature (TAT) - °C Static Air 27.3 10.4 -11.8 -27.4 -43.9 -43.8 Temperature (SAT) - °C Latitude (LAT) 2.667 3.074 3.553 4.109 4.708 5.299 Longitude (LONG) 101.715 101.760 01.988 102.251 102.434 102.713 Gross Weight 492,520 489,200 486,240 483,840 481,880 480,600 (GWT) – lb Total Remaining 49,200 47,800 46,500 45,400 44,500 43,800 Fuel Weight (TOTFW) - kg Wind Direction 140.3 107.6 1.8 58.4 69.6 70.0 (WINDIR) Wind Speed 1.25 9.38 19.50 10.63 17.38 17.13 (WINDSP) True Heading -33.5 27.7 27.8 26.0 26.8 26.7 (THDG) Table 1.9A - ACARS Position Report
  
  Figure 1.9H - Position Report
  
  The first message sent to the aircraft cockpit printer from the MAS ODC was at 1803:23 UTC. The ACARS message requested the crew to contact the HCM ACC immediately. The incoming downlink message at 1803:24 UTC showed the message failed to reach the aircraft. Messages are auto transmitted every 2 minutes and the message was retransmitted until 1843:33 UTC but all messages failed to get a response. Automated downlink message by ACARS showed ‘failed’. Message sent to the aircraft cockpit printer and the Automated Downlink messages are shown in and Figures 1.9I 1.9J (below), respectively.
  
  Figure 1.9I - Message from MH ODC
  
  Figure 1.9J - Automated Downlink Message

1.9.5 Satellite Communications

Satellite Communications System Description
Satellite Communications (SATCOM) is an acronym of, and generic term for, satellite communications. SATCOM operates by using satellites to relay radio signals between the sender and receiver. It can cover far more distance and wider areas than other radios. SATCOM can be used to transmit words, pictures and other forms of information.

The aircraft, 9M-MRO, was equipped with a SATCOM terminal that used the Inmarsat Classic Aero system. The Inmarsat system utilises a constellation of satellites to provide nearly global coverage, the exception being polar areas. The aircraft SATCOM system, also referred to as an Airborne Earth Station (AES) operates on L Band, transmits at 1.6 GHz and receives at 1.5 GHz. For this aircraft, the

SATCOM system provided a total of five voice channels and one data channel. The satellite link provides the following functions:
- Audio and text communication;
- ACARS data; and
- In-flight Entertainment (IFE) Equipment connectivity.
  The Earth or Ground Station uses C Band, transmits at 6 GHz and receives at 4 GHz. Inmarsat uses a network of Ground Earth Stations (GES) to communicate with the satellites and connect the SATCOM signal to other terrestrial data networks such as telephone systems, internet, etc.
  
  When the SATCOM AES is first powered on, it sends a log-on request to the GES to initiate service.
  
  There are a number of channels available for messages to be sent between the Satellite and Earth Station. One of the channels is called the ‘common access channel’, which aircraft will constantly listen to when able to do so.
  
  If the GES has not heard from an aircraft for an hour after the last communication, it automatically transmits a ‘log on interrogation’ (“ping”) message on the common access frequency using the aircraft’s unique identifier. If the aircraft receives its ‘unique identifier’, it returns a short message that it is still logged onto the network. Both the initial log-on request and the hourly ping have been termed as a ‘handshake'.
  
  The SATCOM AES consists of the following equipment: Radio frequency unit (RFU), Radio frequency attenuator (RF ATTN), Radio frequency splitter (RFS), Class C high power amplifier (HPA), Class A high power amplifier (HPA), High power relay (HPR), three low noise amplifier/diplexers (LNA/DIPs), Low gain antenna (LGA), two beam steering units (BSUs), two high gain antennas (HGAs), Radio frequency combiner (RFC) and Satellite data unit (SDU).
  
  The SATCOM avionics are located on the E11 rack, which is in the crown area aft of doors 3 left/right. The High Gain antennas are mounted above door 3 left and door 3 right. The Low Gain antenna is mounted on the fuselage centreline. The SATCOM Circuit Breakers (CB) are located in the Main Equipment Center (MEC).
  
  The Satellite Data Unit (SDU) receives 115V AC from the Left Main bus. In flight, this bus can be powered by engine mounted generators or the APU generator. Neither the aircraft battery nor the ram air turbine will power the SATCOM system.
  
  The diagram in (below) shows the complete set of Figure 1.9K SATCOM units, including avionics, High Gain Antenna Subsystem and Low Gain Antenna Subsystem. It also shows interfaces to the aircraft cockpit and cabin systems and functions. The following notes are intended to be read in conjunction with (below): Figure 1.9K
1. CDU (3) are the three Control Display Units, otherwise known as Multi-function Control Display Units (MCDUs).
2. CPMU is Cabin Passenger Management Unit, which provides an interface between the Panasonic IFE and the SDU, for any Data-3 SMS/e-mail messages.
3. AMU is the Audio Management Unit, which feeds cockpit audio to and from the SDU.
4. CTU is the Cabin Telecommunications Unit, which provides an interface between the in-seat handsets and the SDU, for cabin telephony calls, were that functions available. In the case of 9M-MRO, the in-seat phones can only be used for seat-to-seat calling.
5. AIMS Cabinet is one of two Airplane Information Management System cabinets, which route numerous information to and from the SDU, including ACARS data, Navigational data, AES ID and Flight ID.
6. SATCOM Maintenance Switch is not relevant to this document, as no maintenance activity is possible in flight.
  Figure 1.9K - SATCOM System
  
  The photo in (below) shows the Honeywell/Racal Figure 1.9L (Honeywell/Thales) MCS-6000 SATCOM Units - RFU (left), SDU (centre) and HPA (right).
  
  Figure 1.9L - RFU (left), SDU (centre) and HPA (right)
Satellite Communications Ground Station Logs of the Event - Introduction
Throughout the flight of MH370, the aircraft communicated through the Inmarsat Indian Ocean Region (IOR) I-3 Satellite and the GES in Perth, Australia.

(below) shows the Inmarsat I-3 IOR Satellite Coverage Figure 1.9M Map. The blue lines represent the elevation angle to the IOR satellite for a SATCOM unit on the ground or in the air. Due to the satellite inclination, the elevation angles are approximate.

Figure 1.9M - Inmarsat I-3 IOR Satellite Coverage Map

MH370 departed KLIA at 1642 UTC [0042 MYT, 08 March 2014]. At 1707 UTC, the SATCOM system was used to send a standard ACARS report, normally sent every 30 minutes. The message also indicated the remaining fuel on-board.

The ACARS reports expected at 1737 UTC and 1807 UTC were not received. The next SATCOM communication was a log-on request from the aircraft at 1825 UTC. From that point until 0011 UTC, SATCOM transmissions indicate that the link was available, although not used for any voice, ACARS or other data services apart from two unanswered ground-to-air telephone calls. At 0019 UTC, the AES initiated another log-on request. The log-on acknowledge was the last transmission from the SATCOM.

The SATCOM link was available for most of the flight, excluding a period of between 22 and 78 minutes leading up to 1825 UTC, 07 March and a period of less than 8 minutes leading up to 0019 UTC, 08 March 2014. The absence of any aircraft-initiated handshakes, and on-going success of ground-initiated handshakes, indicates that power to the SATCOM was maintained other than the two periods stated above.

Data from the last seven ‘handshakes’ were used to help establish the most probable location of the aircraft. Initially only the first six of these ‘handshakes’ were considered to be complete. The seventh and last ‘handshake’ that was automatically initiated by the aircraft, was originally assessed as a partial ‘handshake’. Subsequent 7th analysis confirmed the handshake could be used to help determine the most probable flight path. Two unanswered ground-to- air telephone calls had the effect of resetting the activity log and hence increased the period between the ground initiated ‘handshakes’. The significant times used to identify the most probable final location of the aircraft are tabulated in Table 1.9B below. Details of the event’s SATCOM ground station logs are provided in (below). Section 1.9.5 para. 3) and 4)

SATCOM TRANSMISSIONS TIME UTC MYT* 1. Aircraft departed KLIA 1642 0042 2. Last ACARS transmission 1707 0107 1st 3. handshake - log-on initiated by the aircraft 1825 0225 4. Unanswered ground-to-air telephone call 1839 0239 2nd 5. handshake initiated by ground station 1941 0341 3rd 6. handshake initiated by ground station 2041 0441 4th 7. handshake initiated by ground station 2141 0541 5th 8. handshake initiated by ground station 2241 0641 9. Unanswered ground-to-air telephone call 2313 0713 6th 10. handshake initiated by ground station * 0011 0811

7th 11. handshake - log-on initiated by the aircraft * 0019 0819

12. Aircraft did not respond to ‘handshake’ from * 0115 0915 Satellite Earth Ground Station * 08 March 2014 Table 1.9B - SATCOM ‘Handshakes’
Satellite Communications Ground Station Logs of the Event - Summary
The SATCOM utilised the Inmarsat Indian Ocean Region (IOR) I-3 satellite and the associated Perth Ground Earth Station (GES) throughout the flight. Inmarsat has confirmed that during the flight, no SATCOM signalling or traffic was routed via any other satellites MTSAT11 (including MTSAT) to any other GESs (including GESs).

The SATCOM provides the Satellite link for the following functions:
- Cockpit Voice - Call control via the Multi-function Control and Display Units (MCDUs) and audio via the cockpit Audio Management Unit (AMU) and associated headsets;
- Cockpit Packet Data (Data-2) - Interface via the ACARS Management Unit (MU); and
  11 MTSAT - A series of Japanese weather and aviation satellites and GESs. MTSAT-1R and MTSAT-2 satellites are interoperable with Inmarsat satellites. 121
  
  Cabin Packet Data (Data-3) - Interface via the Panasonic System • 3000i IFE equipment:
- SMS/e-Mail - BITE-offload
  The GES logs contain the following key information for each transmission to and from the aircraft:
- Time tag, Satellite and GES (Note: the timestamp accuracy does vary between the different logs, but should always be <1 second, and usually to a few milliseconds);
- Channel Type, Channel Number (frequency), Received Carrier/Noise Density Ratio (C/No), channel Bit-Error-Rate (BER), Burst Frequency Offset (BFO) and Burst Timing Offset (BTO, or round trip delay); and
- All payload data (excluding voice frames) contained within the transmission - these are known as the Signal Unit contents.
  The events are summarised below. All times are in UTC. In the summary below, times are truncated to the nearest minute (the format is Hours Minutes) and in 4), times are truncated Section 1.9.5 para. to the nearest second (the format is Hours Minutes:Seconds).
  
  No. Summary of SATCOM Ground Station Logs 1. Prior to take-off, the SATCOM Logged On (normally) a number of times, the last time being at 1600, when it sent a valid Flight ID to the GES. The SATCOM link was available for both voice and data (known as Log-On Class 3). 2. After take-off, the IFE SMS email application sent a normal beginning-of-flight message at 1642 (containing the correct Airborne Earth Station [AES ID], Flight ID "MAS370", origin airport "WMKK", and destination airport "ZBAA"), indicating that the IFE was receiving the valid Flight ID, origin airport and destination airport from AIMS and the ICAO (AES) ID from the Satellite Data Unit (SDU) at this time. 3. The SATCOM link was available for most of the flight, excluding periods leading up to 1825 UTC, 07 March and 0019 UTC, 08 March 2014. cont…
  
  No. Summary of SATCOM Ground Station Logs 4. When the SATCOM link was re-established at the above times, no Flight ID was present 5. During each of the two in-flight Log Ons at 1825 UTC and 0019 UTC, the GES recorded abnormal frequency offsets for the burst transmission from the SATCOM. 6. There is no indication of the SATCOM link being manually Logged Off from the cockpit (via an MCDU). Such activity would have been captured in the GES logs, but it was not. 7. No Data - 2 ACARS traffic was observed after 1707 UTC 07 March 2014. 8. The IFE equipment set up two ground connections over SATCOM [for the SMS e-mail application and Built-In Test Equipment (BITE) application] after the SATCOM re- established the link at 1825 UTC, 07 March 2014 (normal), but not after the SATCOM re-established the link at 0019 UTC, 08 March (abnormal). At no time during the flight was any user data sent over the link by means of the SMS/e-Mail application. 9. Two Ground-to-Air Telephone Calls were placed to the cockpit from MAS Operations Centre (MOC) at Airline Operational Communications (AOC) Q10 priority level at 1839 UTC and at 2313 UTC, 07 March 2014. Neither of the calls was answered.
  
  10. The SATCOM responded normally to a series of roughly hourly Log-On Interrogations from the Perth GES, up to and including a Log-On Interrogation at 0011 UTC, 08 March 2014. The two unanswered ground to air calls at 1839 UTC and 2313 UTC reset the Perth GES inactivity timer and hence the Log- On Interrogations were not always hourly.
  
  11. The last transmission received from the SATCOM occurred at 0019 UTC, 08 March 2014 and the SATCOM failed to respond to a series of three Log-On interrogations starting at 0115 UTC, 08 March 2014.
Satellite Communications Ground Station Logs – Key Observations (in chronological order) [below]) (Table 1.9C
No. Time (UTC) Key Observations - Satellite Ground Station Logs 1. 1250:19 Prior to take-off, the SATCOM initiates a normal Log-On as Class 1 (data only capable) via the Pacific Ocean Region (POR) I-3 satellite, using the Low Gain Antenna (LGA) subsystem, suggesting that ADIRU (Air Data Inertial Reference Unit) navigation data was not available to the SDU at this time. No flight ID is sent to the GES at this time. This is the first SATCOM activity recorded at the GES since 0802:27, suggesting that the SATCOM was not powered for a period of several hours, whilst the aircraft was on ground. This is quite normal. 2. 1555:57 The SATCOM initiates a normal Log On Renewal as Class 1 (data only capable) via the POR I-3 satellite, using the LGA subsystem, this time with a valid Flight ID. 3. 1557:49 The SATCOM initiates a normal Log-On as Class 3 (voice and data capable) via the POR I-3 satellite, using the High Gain Antenna (HGA) subsystem, with a valid Flight ID. This suggests that the ADIRU derived navigation data has become available at this time. 4. 1559:57 The SATCOM initiates a Log-On handover as Class 3 (voice and data capable) to the IOR I-3 satellite, using the HGA subsystem, with a valid Flight ID. This suggests that the IOR is now considered to be the best available satellite. This is probably because either the line of sight to the IOR satellite is now clearer than that to the POR satellite, or the antenna gain in the direction of the IOR satellite has become higher than the antenna gain in the direction of the POR satellite.

5. 1642:04 After take-off, the IFE SMS e-mail application sends a normal beginning-of-flight message. a. The message contained the correct AES ID, Flight ID "MAS370", origin airport "WMKK", and destination airport "ZBAA". b. This indicates that the IFE was receiving the Flight ID, origin airport and destination airport from AIMS and the ICAO (AES) ID from the SDU at this time.

Table 1.9C - Chronology of Satellite Communications Ground Station Logs cont…

Table 1.9C – Chronology of Satellite Communications Ground Station Logs
No.	Time (UTC)	Key Observations - Satellite Ground Station Logs
1.	1250:19	Prior to take-off, the SATCOM initiates a normal Log-On as Class 1 (data only capable) via the Pacific Ocean Region (POR) I-3 satellite, using the Low Gain Antenna (LGA) subsystem, suggesting that ADIRU (Air Data Inertial Reference Unit) navigation data was not available to the SDU at this time. No flight ID is sent to the GES at this time. This is the first SATCOM activity recorded at the GES since 0802:27, suggesting that the SATCOM was not powered for a period of several hours, whilst the aircraft was on ground. This is quite normal.
2.	1555:57	The SATCOM initiates a normal Log On Renewal as Class 1 (data only capable) via the POR I-3 satellite, using the LGA subsystem, this time with a valid Flight ID.
3.	1557:49	The SATCOM initiates a normal Log-On as Class 3 (voice and data capable) via the POR I-3 satellite, using the High Gain Antenna (HGA) subsystem, with a valid Flight ID. This suggests that the ADIRU derived navigation data has become available at this time.
4.	1559:57	The SATCOM initiates a Log-On handover as Class 3 (voice and data capable) to the IOR I-3 satellite, using the HGA subsystem, with a valid Flight ID. This suggests that the IOR is now considered to be the best available satellite. This is probably because either the line of sight to the IOR satellite is now clearer than that to the POR satellite, or the antenna gain in the direction of the IOR satellite has become higher than the antenna gain in the direction of the POR satellite.
5.	1642:04	After take-off, the IFE SMS e-mail application sends a normal beginning-of-flight message. a. The message contained the correct AES ID, Flight ID "MAS370", origin airport "WMKK", and destination airport "ZBAA". b. This indicates that the IFE was receiving the Flight ID, origin airport and destination airport from AIMS and the ICAO (AES) ID from the SDU at this time.
6.	1707:48	Last DATA-2 ACARS Message received at the GES. No further SATCOM Data-2 ACARS messages or acknowledgements were received at the GES for the remainder of the flight. This is abnormal and suggests that the on-board ACARS equipment either failed, or was disabled or powered down at some time between 1707:48 and around 1825:00.
7.	1803:41	GES initiates a DATA-2 ACARS transmission (uplink), but receives no acknowledgement from the SATCOM. a. Therefore, the SATCOM Link was lost at sometime between 1707:48 and 1803:41. b. There is no evidence of a cockpit-initiated manual Log-Off of the SATCOM. c. Note that even if the on-board ACARs equipment was failed, disabled or powered down at this time, it would not prevent the SATCOM from acknowledging the ACARS-related P-Channel transmissions from the GES.
8.	1805:11	GES initiates a DATA-2 ACARS transmission, but receives no acknowledgement from the SATCOM, indicating that there is still no SATCOM link at this time.
9.	1825:27	SATCOM Log-On, initiated from the aircraft terminal. a. This is the first ‘handshake’. b. This marks the end of the link lost period that began at sometime between 1707:48 and 1803:41. c. This log-on request suggests that whatever caused the SATCOM link loss to occur between 1707:48 and 1803:41 had been reversed.
10.	1825:34	SATCOM Log-On, successfully completed. a. The SATCOM link becomes available (for both voice and data - Class 3) once more and normal SATCOM operation resumes (except that there is no Data-2 ACARS traffic). b. No Flight ID was sent to the GES during the Log-On. This implies that the SDU stopped receiving a valid Flight ID from the AIMS at sometime between 1642:04 and 1825:00. cont…
10. cont…	1825:34	c. The possible reasons for the link loss and the subsequent Log-On that took place at 1825:00 have been investigated and are detailed in Table 2.5A. There are many quite complicated scenarios that could have caused the 1825:00 Log-On. However, the most likely reason is a power interrupt to the SATCOM avionics, of a duration greater than 22 minutes (the time between events 7 and 9) and less than 78 minutes (the time between events 6 and 9). d. The GES recorded an abnormal BFO for the SATCOM Log-On Acknowledge transmissions (Sections 1.9.5 para. 5) and 2.5.3). • 1825:00 Log-On Acknowledge - Most likely due to the power-on drift of the Oven Controlled Crystal Oscillator (OCXO), thus endorsing the belief that the 1825:00 Log- On was preceded by a lengthy power interrupt. An OCXO provides a stable reference frequency for the SDU Radio Frequency (RF) transmit and receive circuits and also for SDU modem timing. Within the OCXO, a regulated oven keeps the crystal at an almost constant temperature if the ambient temperature in the crown area is between the ranges -55oC up to above +70oC. The oven also contains extra electrical regulation and isolation to ensure frequency accuracy and stability. The OCXO includes an oven ready flag, which triggers the Log-On initiation when the OCXO reaches its operating temperature. Extensive laboratory testing has revealed that during warm up, the OCXO frequency may vary non-linearly with time, but then settles with almost negligible variation. At power-on, the OCXO can exhibit either a rising or falling frequency gradient, before decaying over time to its normal steady state value. The testing has indicated that reasonable stability (within 2Hz/minute) is typically reached by around five minutes after an initial peak or overshoot. The testing has also shown that there can still be a significant frequency offset at the time that the oven ready flag initiates the Log-On process, so the Log-On request, Log-On Acknowledge and subsequent data bursts can all exhibit significant frequency offsets.
11.	1827:03	The IFE sets up a Data-3 ground connection (X.25 circuit) over SATCOM for an SMS/e-mail application after the SATCOM link is re-established.
12.	1828:05	The IFE sets up a Data-3 ground connection (X.25 circuit) over SATCOM for a BITE application after the SATCOM link is re- established.
13. .	1839:52	Ground-to-air telephony call placed from a number with country code 60 (Malaysia) a. Q10 Airline Operational Communications (AOC) Priority Level b. The Perth GES logs indicate that a good link is likely to have existed at this time. c. This call would have been routed to the cockpit and should have resulted in a chime and an incoming visual annunciation on the Audio Control Panels (ACPs), and, if the appropriate SATCOM page was selected, then also on one or more MCDU. d. The GES logs show zero duration, indicating that the call went unanswered. Note that there are two methods for the answering of an incoming call: Either by pressing the relevant Line Select Key on an MCDU, or by keying a microphone.
14.	1840:56	The GES logs show that the unanswered Ground-to-Air telephony call was cleared by the calling party.
15.	1941:00	Log-On Interrogation by the Perth GES, with a response from the SATCOM a. This is the second ‘handshake’, whereby the GES inactivity timer has expired and the GES has sent a message to interrogate the status of the SATCOM. b. The SATCOM responded normally and the SATCOM link was therefore available at this time.
16.	2041:02	Log-On Interrogation by the Perth GES, with a response from the SATCOM a. This is the third ‘handshake’. b. The SATCOM responded normally and the SATCOM link was therefore available at this time.
17.	2141:24	Log-On Interrogation by the Perth GES, with a response from the SATCOM a. This is the fourth ‘handshake’. \ b. The SATCOM responded normally and the SATCOM link was therefore available at this time.
18.	2241:19	Log-On Interrogation by the Perth GES, with a response from the SATCOM a. This is the fifth ‘handshake’. b. The SATCOM responded normally and the SATCOM link was therefore available at this time.
19.	2313:58	Ground-to-air telephony call placed from a number with country code 60 (Malaysia) a. Q10 AOC Priority Level. b. The Perth GES logs indicate that a good link is likely to have existed at this time. c. This call would have been routed to the cockpit and should have resulted in a chime and an incoming visual annunciation on the Audio Control Panels, and, if the appropriate SATCOM page was selected, then also on one or more MCDU. d. The GES logs show zero duration, indicating that the call went unanswered. Note that there are two methods for the answering of an incoming call: Either by pressing the relevant Line Select Key on an MCDU, or by keying a microphone.
20.	2315:02	The GES logs show that the unanswered Ground to Air telephony call was cleared by the calling party.
21.	0010:58	Log-On Interrogation by the Perth GES, with a response from the SATCOM a. This is the sixth ‘handshake’. b. The SATCOM responded normally and the SATCOM link was therefore available at this time.
22.	0019:29	SATCOM Log-On, initiated from the aircraft terminal. This is the seventh ‘handshake’. a. For there to have been a Log-On at this time, there must have been a prior loss of the SATCOM link. This link loss must have occurred at some time after 0010:58, when the SATCOM responded to a Log-On interrogation. b. This Log-On request suggests that whatever caused the SATCOM link loss to occur had been reversed.
23.	0019:37	SATCOM Log-On, successfully completed a. The SATCOM link becomes available (for voice and data – Class 3) once more and normal SATCOM operation resumes. b. No Flight ID was sent to the GES during the Log-On. This infers that the SDU was still not receiving the Flight ID from AIMS. c. The possible reasons for the link loss and the subsequent Log- On that took place at 0019:00 have been investigated and are detailed in Section 2.5.2. There are many quite complicated scenarios that could have caused the 0019:00 Log-On with no Flight ID. However, the most likely reason is a power interrupt to the SATCOM avionics, of a duration less than 8 minutes. d. The GES recorded an abnormal frequency offset for the SATCOM Log-On Request and Acknowledge transmissions (see Sections 1.9.5 para. 5) and 2.5.3). The abnormal BFOs for the 0019 Log-On Request and Log-On Acknowledge are more likely due to a combination of uncompensated vertical velocity (descent) and OCXO warm up drift. e) The IFE did not subsequently establish the two Data-3 X.25 connections over the SATCOM, which it normally does if it is functional. It can be inferred that the IFE was either not operating at this time (powered off, not being powered whilst the SATCOM was being powered by the APU, failed, or still resetting after a power cycle), or the SATCOM and/or the IFE became inoperative before the IFE was able to establish the Data-3 connection Note: This is the last transmission received from the aircraft terminal.
24.	0115:56	Log-On Interrogation by the Perth GES, with no response from the SATCOM a. The SATCOM Link was lost at sometime between 0019:37 and 0115:56. b. There is no evidence of a cockpit-initiated manual Log-Off of the SATCOM. c. The loss of SATCOM link was due to one of the following: i. The SATCOM stopped receiving the P-Channel transmission from the satellite ii. SATCOM input power (115VAC 400Hz) was removed iii. The SATCOM experienced a BITE failure.
25.	0116:06	Log-On Interrogation by the Perth GES, with no response from the SATCOM.
26.	0116:15	Log-On Interrogation by the Perth GES, with no response from the SATCOM.

No. Time (UTC) Key Observations - Satellite Ground Station Logs 6. 1707:48 Last DATA-2 ACARS Message received at the GES. No further SATCOM Data-2 ACARS messages or acknowledgements were received at the GES for the remainder of the flight. This is abnormal and suggests that the on-board ACARS equipment either failed, or was disabled or powered down at some time between 1707:48 and around 1825:00. 7. 1803:41 GES initiates a DATA-2 ACARS transmission (uplink), but receives no acknowledgement from the SATCOM. a. Therefore, the SATCOM Link was lost at sometime between 1707:48 and 1803:41. b. There is no evidence of a cockpit-initiated manual Log-Off of the SATCOM. c. Note that even if the on-board ACARs equipment was failed, disabled or powered down at this time, it would not prevent the SATCOM from acknowledging the ACARS-related P-Channel transmissions from the GES. 8. 1805:11 GES initiates a DATA-2 ACARS transmission, but receives no acknowledgement from the SATCOM, indicating that there is still no SATCOM link at this time. 9. 1825:27 SATCOM Log-On, initiated from the aircraft terminal. a. This is the first ‘handshake’. b. This marks the end of the link lost period that began at sometime between 1707:48 and 1803:41. c. This log-on request suggests that whatever caused the SATCOM link loss to occur between 1707:48 and 1803:41 had been reversed. 10. 1825:34 SATCOM Log-On, successfully completed.

a. The SATCOM link becomes available (for both voice and data - Class 3) once more and normal SATCOM operation resumes (except that there is no Data-2 ACARS traffic).

b. No Flight ID was sent to the GES during the Log-On. This implies that the SDU stopped receiving a valid Flight ID from the AIMS at sometime between 1642:04 and 1825:00. cont…

No. Time (UTC) Key Observations - Satellite Ground Station Logs 10. 1825:34 c. The possible reasons for the link loss and the subsequent Log-On that took place at 1825:00 have been investigated and cont… are detailed in 2.5A. There are many quite complicated Table scenarios that could have caused the 1825:00 Log-On. However, the most likely reason is a power interrupt to the SATCOM avionics, of a duration greater than 22 minutes (the time between events 7 and 9) and less than 78 minutes (the time between events 6 and 9).

d. The GES recorded an abnormal BFO for the SATCOM Log-On Acknowledge transmissions (Sections 5) 1.9.5 para. and 2.5.3). • 1825:00 Log-On Acknowledge - Most likely due to the power-on drift of the Oven Controlled Crystal Oscillator (OCXO), thus endorsing the belief that the 1825:00 Log- On was preceded by a lengthy power interrupt. An OCXO provides a stable reference frequency for the SDU Radio Frequency (RF) transmit and receive circuits and also for SDU modem timing. Within the OCXO, a regulated oven keeps the crystal at an almost constant temperature if the ambient temperature in the crown area is between the ranges -55oC +70oC. up to above The oven also contains extra electrical regulation and isolation to ensure frequency accuracy and stability. The OCXO includes an oven ready flag, which triggers the Log-On initiation when the OCXO reaches its operating temperature. Extensive laboratory testing has revealed that during warm up, the OCXO frequency may vary non-linearly with time, but then settles with almost negligible variation. At power-on, the OCXO can exhibit either a rising or falling frequency gradient, before decaying over time to its normal steady state value. The testing has indicated that reasonable stability (within 2Hz/minute) is typically reached by around five minutes after an initial peak or overshoot. The testing has also shown that there can still be a significant frequency offset at the time that the oven ready flag initiates the Log-On process, so the Log-On request, Log-On Acknowledge and subsequent data bursts can all exhibit significant frequency offsets. Table 1.9C - Chronology of Satellite Communications Ground Station Logs cont…

No. Time (UTC) Key Observations - Satellite Ground Station Logs 11. 1827:03 The IFE sets up a Data-3 ground connection (X.25 circuit) over SATCOM for an SMS/e-mail application after the SATCOM link is re-established. 12. 1828:05 The IFE sets up a Data-3 ground connection (X.25 circuit) over SATCOM for a BITE application after the SATCOM link is re- established. 13. 1839:52 Ground-to-air telephony call placed from a number with country code 60 (Malaysia) . a. Q10 Airline Operational Communications (AOC) Priority Level b. The Perth GES logs indicate that a good link is likely to have existed at this time. c. This call would have been routed to the cockpit and should have resulted in a chime and an incoming visual annunciation on the Audio Control Panels (ACPs), and, if the appropriate SATCOM page was selected, then also on one or more MCDU.

d. The GES logs show zero duration, indicating that the call went unanswered. Note that there are two methods for the answering of an incoming call: Either by pressing the relevant Line Select Key on an MCDU, or by keying a microphone. 14. 1840:56 The GES logs show that the unanswered Ground-to-Air telephony call was cleared by the calling party. 15. 1941:00 Log-On Interrogation by the Perth GES, with a response from the SATCOM

a. This is the second ‘handshake’, whereby the GES inactivity timer has expired and the GES has sent a message to interrogate the status of the SATCOM.

b. The SATCOM responded normally and the SATCOM link was therefore available at this time. 16. 2041:02 Log-On Interrogation by the Perth GES, with a response from the SATCOM a. This is the third ‘handshake’. b. The SATCOM responded normally and the SATCOM link was therefore available at this time.

No. Time (UTC) Key Observations - Satellite Ground Station Logs 17. 2141:24 Log-On Interrogation by the Perth GES, with a response from the SATCOM a. This is the fourth ‘handshake’. \ b. The SATCOM responded normally and the SATCOM link was therefore available at this time.

18. 2241:19 Log-On Interrogation by the Perth GES, with a response from the SATCOM a. This is the fifth ‘handshake’. b. The SATCOM responded normally and the SATCOM link was therefore available at this time.

19. 2313:58 Ground-to-air telephony call placed from a number with country code 60 (Malaysia)

a. Q10 AOC Priority Level. b. The Perth GES logs indicate that a good link is likely to have existed at this time. c. This call would have been routed to the cockpit and should have resulted in a chime and an incoming visual annunciation on the Audio Control Panels, and, if the appropriate SATCOM page was selected, then also on one or more MCDU. d. The GES logs show zero duration, indicating that the call went unanswered. Note that there are two methods for the answering of an incoming call: Either by pressing the relevant Line Select Key on an MCDU, or by keying a microphone.

20. 2315:02 The GES logs show that the unanswered Ground to Air telephony call was cleared by the calling party.

21. 0010:58 Log-On Interrogation by the Perth GES, with a response from the SATCOM a. This is the sixth ‘handshake’. b. The SATCOM responded normally and the SATCOM link was therefore available at this time. Table 1.9C - Chronology of Satellite Communications Ground Station Log cont…

No. Time (UTC) Key Observations - Satellite Ground Station Logs 22. 0019:29 SATCOM Log-On, initiated from the aircraft terminal. This is the seventh ‘handshake’. a. For there to have been a Log-On at this time, there must have been a prior loss of the SATCOM link. This link loss must have occurred at some time after 0010:58, when the SATCOM responded to a Log-On interrogation.

b. This Log-On request suggests that whatever caused the SATCOM link loss to occur had been reversed. 23. 0019:37 SATCOM Log-On, successfully completed

a. The SATCOM link becomes available (for voice and data – Class 3) once more and normal SATCOM operation resumes. b. No Flight ID was sent to the GES during the Log-On. This infers that the SDU was still not receiving the Flight ID from AIMS. c. The possible reasons for the link loss and the subsequent Log- On that took place at 0019:00 have been investigated and are detailed in Section 2.5.2. There are many quite complicated scenarios that could have caused the 0019:00 Log-On with no Flight ID. However, the most likely reason is a power interrupt to the SATCOM avionics, of a duration less than 8 minutes. d. The GES recorded an abnormal frequency offset for the SATCOM Log-On Request and Acknowledge transmissions (see 2.5.3). The abnormal BFOs Sections 1.9.5 para. 5) and for the 0019 Log-On Request and Log-On Acknowledge are more likely due to a combination of uncompensated vertical velocity (descent) and OCXO warm up drift. e) The IFE did not subsequently establish the two Data-3 X.25 connections over the SATCOM, which it normally does if it is functional. It can be inferred that the IFE was either not operating at this time (powered off, not being powered whilst the SATCOM was being powered by the APU, failed, or still resetting after a power cycle), or the SATCOM and/or the IFE became inoperative before the IFE was able to establish the Data-3 connection Note: This is the last transmission received from the aircraft terminal. Table 1.9C - Chronology of Satellite Communications Ground Station Logs cont…

No. Time (UTC) Key Observations - Satellite Ground Station Logs 24. 0115:56 Log-On Interrogation by the Perth GES, with no response from the SATCOM

a. The SATCOM Link was lost at sometime between 0019:37 and 0115:56. b. There is no evidence of a cockpit-initiated manual Log-Off of the SATCOM. c. The loss of SATCOM link was due to one of the following:

i. The SATCOM stopped receiving the P-Channel transmission from the satellite

ii. SATCOM input power (115VAC 400Hz) was removed

iii. The SATCOM experienced a BITE failure.

25. 0116:06 Log-On Interrogation by the Perth GES, with no response from the SATCOM.

26. 0116:15 Log-On Interrogation by the Perth GES, with no response from the SATCOM.

Frequencies of Log-On Bursts
During each of the two in-flight Log-Ons that occurred at 1825 and 0019, the GES recorded abnormal frequency offsets for the SATCOM transmissions. This is in contrast with the ‘normal’ Log-On behaviour.

(below) shows the frequencies of these Log-On bursts, as Table 1.9D measured at the GES, plus differences from assumed reference frequencies (closest stable values in time, where the aircraft is assumed to be in level flight). The table also shows the very high delta frequencies between the respective Log-On Request and Log-On Acknowledge bursts.

Table 1.9D – Frequencies of Log-On Bursts (Burst Frequency Offsets)

Table 1.9D – Frequencies of Log-On Bursts
Log-On Time	1825	0019
BFO used as a reference (closest stable value, assume level flight)	144Hz @ 1828:05	252Hz @ 0010:59
Log-On Request BFO	142Hz @ 1825:27	182Hz @ 0019:29
Log-On Request C/No recorded at GES	30.28	40.59
Log-On Request Channel BER recorded at GES	5	0
Log-On Request Difference Frequency (from BFO reference)	-2Hz @ 1825:27	-70Hz @ 0019:29
Log-On Acknowledge BFO	273Hz @ 1825:34	-2Hz @ 0019:37
Log-On Acknowledge C/No recorded at GES	42.55	43.38
Log-On Acknowledge Channel BER recorded at GES	0	0
Log-On Acknowledge Difference Frequency (from BFO reference)	+129Hz @ 1825:34	-254Hz @ 0019:37
Delta frequency between the Log-On Request and the Log-On Acknowledge bursts, plus time period	+131Hz over 7 seconds	-184Hz over 8 seconds

130SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORT MH370 (9M-MRO)

Log-On Time 1825 0019 BFO used as a reference (closest stable value, 144Hz @ 252Hz @ assume level flight) 1828:05 0010:59 142Hz @ 182Hz @ Log-On Request BFO 1825:27 0019:29 Log-On Request C/No recorded at GES 30.28 40.59

Log-On Request Channel BER recorded at GES 5 0 Log-On Request Difference Frequency (from -2Hz @ -70Hz @ BFO reference) 1825:27 0019:29 273Hz @ -2Hz @ Log-On Acknowledge BFO 1825:34 0019:37 Log-On Acknowledge C/No recorded at GES 42.55 43.38 Log-On Acknowledge Channel BER recorded at 0 0 GES Log-On Acknowledge Difference Frequency +129Hz @ -254Hz @ (from BFO reference) 1825:34 0019:37 Delta frequency between the Log-On Request -184Hz +131Hz over 8 and the Log-On Acknowledge bursts, plus time over 7 seconds seconds period Table 1.9D - Log-On Bursts

1.10 AERODROME INFORMATION

Not applicable.

1.11 FLIGHT RECORDERS

The aircraft was equipped with two crash-protected recorders:

Solid State Flight Data Recorder (SSFDR)
Solid State Cockpit Voice Recorder (SSCVR)
Copyright © Boeing. Reprinted with permission of The Boeing Company

Figure 1.11A - Location of Solid State Flight Data Recorder

1.11.1 Solid State Flight Data Recorder

The solid state flight data recorder (SSFDR) is located in the Electronic Equipment rack, E7, which is in the aft cabin above the ceiling (Figure. [above]). 1.11A

The SSFDR receives and stores selected aircraft parameters from various aircraft systems and sensors in a crash-protected solid state memory.

The flight data recorder system (FDRS) operates during any engine start, while any engine is running, during test or when the aircraft is in the air. The SSFDR is powered from the right AC transfer bus which is powered 133

by the engine generators or the APU generator. If none of these generators are functioning due to non-operation of the engines and APU then the bus will not be powered and the SSFDR will not operate in the air.

This is a solid state flight data recorder (SSFDR) with a recording capacity of at least twenty-five hours.

The SSFDR records the most recent 25 hours of flight and records more than 1300 parameters. The SSFDR is a 256 word per second (wps) data rate recorder. The most recent flight data recorder download for this aircraft was in September 2013 and this was carried out for the annual readout. The annual readout extracts 151 parameters for evaluation. Details of the SSFDR installed and specifications are as follows:

Manufacturer: Honeywell
Model: SSFDR Model 4700
Part Number (P/N): 980-4700-042
Serial Number (S/N): SSFDR-08636
Date last installed on aircraft: 26 August 2012
Weight: 6.8 kg
Electricity Consumption: 15 W, 115 VAC 400 Hz
Impact Shock: 3400 G for 6.5 ms
Fire Temperature: Max 1100°C (30 min)
Deep Sea Pressure and Sea Water Immersion: 20,000 ft.

1.11.2 Solid State Cockpit Voice Recorder

The solid state cockpit voice recorder (SSCVR) is in the Electronic Equipment Rack, E7, in the aft cabin above the ceiling and located adjacent to the SSFDR (Figure [below]). 1-11B

The SSCVR has a recording capacity of at least two hours in standard quality and thirty minutes in high quality.

The voice recorder system receives cockpit sounds and flight crew communications. It keeps this audio in a solid state memory.

Figure 1.11B - Location of Solid State Cockpit Voice Recorder

Four audio channels go to the SSCVR. Channel 1, 2, and 3 audio is from the audio management unit (AMU). Each channel carries audio from one crew member’s flight interphone audio. The audio on each channel is the sum of these signals:

Hot mic audio (microphone audio when there is no press-to-talk [PTT])
Received audio as selected on the crew member’s audio control panel (ACP)
Side tone audio to the crew member
Channel 4 audio is from the Cockpit Area Microphone (CAM). The CAM sends cockpit area audio to the SSCVR. The SSCVR operates any time power is available on the Left AC transfer bus. This bus is not powered from batteries or the Ram Air Turbine (RAT).

Details of the SSCVR installed and the specifications are as follows:
Manufacturer: Honeywell
Model: SSCVR Model 6022
Part Number (P/N): 980-6022-001
Serial Number (S/N): 2677
Date last installed on aircraft: 26 August 2012
Weight: 5.9 kg Electricity Consumption: 8 W, 115 VAC 400 Hz
Impact Shock: 3400 G for 6.5 ms
Fire Temperature: Max 1100°C (30 min)
Deep Sea Pressure and Sea Water Immersion: 20,000 ft.

1.11.3 Underwater Locator Beacons

Both crash-protected recorders were equipped as provided by the regulations with underwater locator beacons (ULB) whose transmission time is at least 30 days, on the 37.5 kHz frequency, operating depth up to 20,000 ft (6096 m) and activated with fresh or salt water immersion. Detail specifications are as per below:

Manufacturer: Dukane Model: DK-100 / DK-120
Operating Frequency: 37.5 kHz ± 1 kHz
Operating Depth: Surface to 20,000 ft. (6,096 meters) Pulse Length: 10 milliseconds + 10%
Pulse Repetition Rate: Not less than 0.9 Pulse/Sec
Operating Life: 30 days (minimum)
Battery Life In Beacon: 6 Years
Acoustic Output, Initial: 1060 dynes/cm² rms pressure at 1 meter (160.5 dB)
Acoustic Output After 30 Days: 700 dynes/cm² rms pressure at 1 meter (157.0 dB)
Operating Temperature Range: +28°F (-2.2°C) to +100°F (+37.8°C)
Actuation: Fresh or salt water Radiation Pattern: Rated output over 80 percent of sphere
Size: 1.30 inches (3.30 cm) diameter x 3.92 inches (9.95 cm) long (less mount)
Weight, Beacon: 6.7 ounces (190 grams) Storage Temperature Range: -65°F (-54°C) to 160°F (71°C)
The SSFDR was attached with a ULB as below:
S/N: SC26210
ULB Expiry Date: December 2012
The SSCVR was attached with ULB as below:
S/N: Not Recorded
ULB Expiry Date: June 2014

Solid State Flight Data Recorder Underwater Locator Beacon Battery Expiry
According to maintenance records, the solid state flight data recorder (SSFDR) Underwater Locator Beacon’s (ULB) battery expired in December 2012. There is no evidence to suggest that the SSFDR ULB battery had been replaced before the expiry date. The SSCVR ULB battery however was replaced, as scheduled, with the next expiry in June 2014.

Technical Log records showed that the SSFDR (together with the ULB) was replaced on the aircraft on 29 February 2008. Component installation records for the ULB showed that at the time the SSFDR was replaced on aircraft the expiry date for the battery was December 2012.

1.12 WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

1.12.1 Introduction

1. Extensive work by the the MH370 Search Strategy Group, coordinated by the ATSB, by analysing signals transmitted by the aircraft’s satellite communications terminal to Inmarsat‘s Indian Ocean Region satellite indicated that the aircraft ended its flight in the Southern Indian Ocean.

The ATSB led the underwater search for MH370 in the southern Indian Ocean. The search area, as shown (below) in 1.12A, covered in Figure excess of 120,000 sq. km at the 7th Arc.

Source: ATSB Figure 1.12A - MH370 Search Area

Further search was carried out by the US company, Ocean Infinity, which covered an area of more than 112,000 sq. km towards the north of the area covered by ATSB on the 7th arc.

No wreckage of the aircraft has been found after the completion of the search. However, several floating components and debris

confirmed/possibly from MH370 have been found as far as the south eastern coast of Africa. Refer to (below). Figure 1.12B

1.12.2 Location of Where the Debris were Found

After a number of assessments, more than 20 items were considered for further examination. These items were found in the north west corner of the Indian Ocean, namely in Réunion Island, Mozambique, Tanzania,

MOZAMBIQUE TANZANIA MADAGASCAR Item Item Item 2 3 6 7 9 22 19 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 23 24 25 -

SOUTH AFRICA RÉUNION ISLAND MAURITIUS Item Item Item 4 20 21 26 27 1 5 8 10 Item Status Total 1, 10 & 19 3 Confirmed 2,3,4,5,6,16 & 22 7 Almost Certain Keys 8, 9, 11, 15, 18, 20 26 & 27 8 Highly Likely 7 & 12 2 Likely 13, 14, 17, 21, 23, 24 & 25 7 Not Identifiable Total 27

Figure 1.12B - Locations and Status of Identification of the Debris

South Africa, Madagascar and Mauritius. (above) Figure 1.12B shows the distribution of the debris found in the above respective areas. (below) provides a summary of the items of Table 1.12A debris examined.